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even for well-intentioned health care providers, the Stark
Law has become a booby trap rigged with strict liability and
potentially ruinous exposure . . . ,,1
Judge James A. Wynn
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
The United States health care industry is at a crossroads. Pressures
from an aging baby boomer population, unsustainable increases in health
care costs, and relatively poor patient care outcomes are interrupting the
traditional ways patients are cared for and health care providers are paid?
Over the years, the federal government has grappled with how to manage
its Medicare" and Medicaid" programs in light of these pressures. In
2011, the federal government expended a total of $545 billion for
Medicare and $256 billion for Medicaid," totaling 5.4% of the nation's
1. United States ex reI. Drakeford v. Tuomey, 792 FJd 364, 395 (4th Cir. 2015)
(Wynn, J., concurring).
2. Technological advances and new market entrants are also considered disruptors in
the health care industry. See Tony Herrling, $2.8 Trillion u.s. Health Care Market
Threatened By Disruptive New Entrants Like Those That Reshaped Retail, Banking and
Travel, According To PwC's Health Research Institute, PRICEWATERHOUSE COOPERS
(Apr.
2014),
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/press-releases/2014/health
care-marketthreatened-by-disruptive-new-entrants.html; Ellen Lee, 5 Ways Technology is
Transforming
Health
Care,
FORBES
(Jan.
2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/bmoharrisbank/2013/01/24/5-ways-technology-istransforming-health-care/# 130cc87c le26.
3. Medicare is a federal health insurance program instituted in 1965 for persons
sixty-five and over. In 1972, it was expanded to cover persons under sixty-five who have
permanent disabilities. It provides for hospital and skilled nursing facility stays as well as
home health visits and hospice care, limited prescription drug coverage, physician visits,
and outpatient services. See Issue Brief An Overview of Medicare, KAISER FAMILY
FOUND. (Apr. 1, 2016), http://kff.orglmedicare/issue-brief/an-overview-of-medicare/.
4. Medicaid is a federal health insurance program instituted in 1965 by the same
federal legislation that instituted Medicare. Medicaid provides health care coverage to
low-income persons, pregnant women, and people with disabilities. Because it is a
program funded by the federal government but administered by the States, the scope of
services available varies from state to state so as to allow each State to tailor its Medicaid
program to the needs of each individual state. See CMS' Program History: Medicare and
Medicaid, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., httpst//www.cms.gov/AboutCMS/Agency-InformationlHistory/index.html?redirect=/History/ (last visited Aug. 18,
2016).
5. National Health Expenditures by Type ofService and Source ofFunds: Calendar
Years 1960-2014, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., http://go.usa.gov/jmGY
(last visited Aug. 18,2016).
6. Id. This figure includes federal expenditure on the Children's Health Insurance
Program (CHIP), which was not in existence in 1970. CHIP provides health care services
to the children of families who do not qualify for Medicaid but who, ordinarily, would
otherwise remain uninsured. In some states, CHIP covers pregnant women, too. As with
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gross domestic product.' Most recently, in 2015, the federal government
expended a total of $634 billion for Medicare and $350 billion for
Medicaid, representing 5.8% of the nation's gross domestic product.8
Unfortunately, there is no end in sight to these rising costs. For 2016,
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) projects spending on federal
health programs and subsidies for health insurance purchased through the
Affordable Care Act's marketplaces" to rise to $1.1 trillion, or 6.2% of
the nation's gross domestic product.i" By the end of 2026, the CBO
further projects these costs will nearly double to $2 trillion, or 7.4% of
the nation's gross domestic product. II
The main reason health care costs are escalating is the current feefor-service payment model that rewards health care providers for the
volume of their services and not their value. 12 Health care providers
seeking reimbursement under Medicare's fee-for-service system (also
known as a prospective payment system) are paid for services based on
predetermined rates for each service set by the Centers and Medicare and
Medicaid (CMS),13 without regard for whether the service is thb most
cost-effective under the circumstances or whether it will contrIbute to
better patient health outcomes. Over the years, this payment sys~m has
been criticized for rewarding health care providers for the voltme of
services without regard for the cost or quality of those services." As a
Medicaid, each state offers CHIP coverage based on the needs existent in their
See
CHIP
Eligibility
Standards,
community.
http://www.medicaid.gov/chip/eligibilitystandards/chip-eligibility-standards.html i
(last
"
visited Aug. 18, 2016).
7. Mindy R. Levit, D. Andrew Austin & Jeffrey M. Stupak, Mandatory Spending
Since 1962,7-5700, 13, CONGo REs. SERV., (2015).
8. The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2015 to 2026, CONGo BUDGET OFF. (Jan. 26,
2016), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51 12920160utlook_OneCol-2.pdf.
9. Since the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in 2010 (42
U.S.C. § 18001 et seq.), the federal government also provides subsidies to persons who
enroll in a health insurance program either through the federal health insurance
marketplace or a state-administered health insurance marketplace.
10. CONGo BUDGET OFF., supra note 8, at 65.
11. Id.
12. Missouri Hospital Association, CBO Releases Its Budget and Economic Outlook:
2016-2026,
FEDERAL
BRIEF
ISSUE
1,
3
(2016),
http://web.mhanet.com/Issue%20Briefs/Issue%20BrieCCBO%20Releases%20Its%20Bu
dget%20and%20Economic%200utlook-20 16%20to%202026_%20012616. pdf.
13. See Office of Inspector General, Oei-09-00-00200, Medicare Hospital
Prospective Payment System: How DRG Rates Are Calculated and Updated (2001).
14. Amy M. Lishko, Physician' Payment Reform: A Review and Updates of the
Models, TuFTS UNIV. SCH. OF MED. 10, http://www.massmed.orgiNews-andPublications/Research-and-Studies/Physician-Payment-Models-MMS-Review-andUpdate-(pdt)/ (last visited Aug. 18,2016).
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consequence, many argue that it rewards over-utilization and results in
increased costs."
Despite the large amount of money invested in health care, the
United States has relatively poor health outcomes. Currently, it "ranks
last overall among [eleven] industrialized countries on measures of
health system quality, efficiency, access to care, equity, and healthy
lives.,,16 Yet, the United States spends more on health care than any other
developed country." In 2010, "the United States spent over $2.6 trillion
on health care, representing roughly 18 percent of gross domestic
product (GDP).,,18 Based on this figure, "health spending in the U.S.
[was] far higher than the United Kingdom (9.6 percent of GDP),
Germany (11.6 percent) or Japan (9.5 percentj.?" Notwithstanding the
amounts of money invested in the U.S. health care system, U. S. patient
care outcomes are poor when compared to these other countries. As
noted in a bipartisan report, "[t]his discrepancy indicates opportunities to
reduce spending while improving care, and the need to carefully examine
the structural aspects of our health care system that contribute to
inefficiency and wasteful spending. ,,20
In an attempt to change the trajectory of the United States health care
system, the federal government has made a concerted effort to test new
payment models that reward quality of care and control costs. As a result
of CMS's success with many of these models." in 2015, Congress

15. Id.
16. See
Health System Ranks Last Among Eleven Countries on Measures of
Access, Equity, Quality, Efficiency, and Healthy Lives, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (June
16, 20 14), http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/press-releases/20 14/jun/ushealth-system-ranks-last.
17. Ashley C. Allen, Countries Spending the Most on Health Care, USA TODAY (July
7,
2014),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/20 14/07/07/countriesspending-most-health-care/12282577/.
18. Paul Ginsburg, Meredith Hughes & Loren Adler, What is Driving US Health
Care Spending: America's Unsustainable Health Care Cost Growth, BIPARTISAN POLICY
CTR. (Sept. 20, 2012), http://bipartisanpolicy.org/library/what-driving~us-health-care
spending-americas-unsustainable-health-care-cost-growth/.
19. Id. at 4.
20. Id.
21. Medicare's Pioneer Accountable Care Organization (ACO) saved over $96
million over a two year period and improved quality of care by 19 percent. Medicare's
Shared Savings Program, ACO, has also shown great success by saving the federal
government $383 million in just one year and achieving improvement in quality of care
in 30 out of 33 quality measures. See Medicare ACOs Continue to Succeed in Improving
Care, Lowering Cost Growth, CrRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS. (Nov. 10,
2014), https://www.cms.goviNewsroomlMediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2014-Factsheets-items/20 14-111O.html?DLPage=1&DLEntries=1O&DLSort=O&DLSortDir=descending.
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enacted the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act
(MACRA).22 Under MACRA, all U.S. health care providers must
participate in one of two new payment models." Implementation of
MACRA will begin in January 2017,24 with full implementation
expected in 2019. 25 Because all health care professionals will be required
to participate in MACRA, the traditional fee-for-service model will soon
be a thing of the past." MACRA's new payment models are intended to
reward health care providers for value, both in lowering costs and
delivering quality care." To achieve this, MACRA will require health
care providers to work with each other in a coordinated and integrated
manner-the opposite of how health care professionals have been
working under the traditional fee-for-service model."
With the imminent transition to MACRA, health care providers fmd
themselves at a crossroads between the old ways of the fee-for-service
world and the new ways of the new payment models. A major area of
concern is the current misalignment between the federal prohibition
against physician self-referral, known as the Stark Law (Stark),29 and
MACRA. 30 Stark prohibits a physician from referring Medicare patients
for designated health services to an entity in which the physician (or
immediate family member) has an ownership interest, an investment

Another alternative payment model is Medicare's Bundled Payments for Care
Improvement (BPCI) Initiative in which reimbursements are made for a group of highly
coordinated services or bundle of services known as an "episode of care." Although
official results of the BPCI Initiative are not due until 2018, preliminary reports show that
the BPCI Initiative is achieving success in increasing quality of care, decreasing
readmission rates, and reducing costs. See Bundled Payments for Care Improvement
Initiative: General Information, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS.,
https:/linnovation.cms.gov/initiatives/bundled-paymentsl (last visited Aug. 18, 2016).
22. Medicare Access and CHIP Authorization Act of2015, Pub. L. No. 114-10, 129
Stat. 87 (2015).
23. Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Re MACRA 's Quality Payment Program, CTRS.
FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS. 1-3, https:llwww.cms.govlMedicare/QualityInitiatives-Patient-Assessment-InstrumentsNalue-Based-Programs/MACRA-MIPS-andAPMsINPRM-QPP-Fact-Sheet.pdf (last visited Aug. 18,2016).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26.Id.
27.Id.
28.Id.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2010).
30. Vera Gruessner, AHA Claims Stark Law Harms Value-Based Care
Reimbursement,
HEALTH
PAYER
INTELLIGENCE
(Feb.
2016),
http://healthpayerintelligence.com/news/aha-claims-stark-law-harms-value-based-carereimbursement.
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interest, or a compensation relationship." The overall essence of Stark's
prohibitions is to discourage cooperation and encourage physicians to
work independently and at arm's length from other health care providers,
including the very entities that employ them.32 In contrast, MACRA's
new payment models require physicians to actively collaborate with
other health care providers during all stages of a patient's care to achieve
better patient outcomes, reduce costs, and eliminate duplication of
services."
One of the hallmarks of MACRA's new payment models is to
provide economic incentives to health care providers so as to drive
cooperative behaviors." The problem is that such incentive payments
may be deemed improper referral fees under Stark's physician
compensation provisions." Consequently, this leaves physicians and
hospitals wondering how to comply with a new payment model that
appears to be in direct conflict with existing law."
In a post-MACRA world, Stark's regulation of physician
compensation is an impediment to payment reform and unnecessary in
light of the modem-day, more robust Anti-Kickback Statute. In support
of this premise, Section I will provide an overview of the Anti-Kickback
Statute and the parallel evolution of Stark. Section II will discuss the
nature of the new payment models and the enactment of MACRA.
Section III will address the misalignment between Stark and MACRA.
Lastly, Section IV will address how best to harmonize Stark with
MACRA given the need, amongst all stakeholders, for MACRA to
succeed.
31. Id.; 42 C.F.R. Subpart J, § 411.354(a)(I) (defining "financial relationship" under
Stark to include "a direct or indirect ownership or investment interest" or "a-direct or
indirect compensation arrangement").
32. The Stark Law: Opportunities to Address Barriers to Clinical Integration, THE
Hosp.
AND
HEALTH
SYS.
OF
PA.,
2
(Jan.
29,
2016),
https://www.haponline.orgIPortals/O/docs/InitiativeslIntegrating_Care/Stark-Law-Memo1-26-14.pdf.
33. Better Care, Smarter Spending, Healthier People: Paying Providers for Value,
Not Volume, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS. (Jan. 26, 2015),
https://www.cms.gov/Newsroom/MediaReleaseDatabase/Fact-sheets/2015-Fact-sheetsitems/20 15-0 1-26-3.html.
34. Gruessner, supra note 30.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2010).
36. Although the .Stark Law enumerates several exceptions that permit physicians to
have certain financial relationships with other providers and CMS has created waivers for
select alternative payment models, these exceptions and waivers do not apply to
MACRA's alternative payment models. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (2016); Fraud and
Abuse Waivers for Select CMS Models and Programs, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND
MEDICAID
SERVS.
(Dec.
2015),
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Fraud-andAbuselPhysicianSelfReferral/Fraud-and-Abuse-Waivers.html.
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1. THE ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE AND PARALLEL EVOLUTION
OF STARK
There have been numerous instances in the history of the United
States of private individuals attempting to profit from the federal
government when taxpayer monies are used for a public purpose. In the
health care industry, although it was long suspected that many health
care providers were over-utilizing Medicare, it was not until the late
1980's and 1990's that studies were conducted to corroborate what was
already known in practice: that providers were more likely to have their
patients over-utilize a service if the provider had a financial interest in
the service prescribed." During this time, the Anti-Kickback Statute"
was a tool already in existence in the federal government's arsenal to
combat fraud and abuse. However, these findings compelled Congress to
enact a law that specifically targeted physician self-referrals and which
we know today as the Stark Law. 39 A brief history of these two laws is
detailed below.
A. The Anti-Kickback Statute
1. The Anti-Kickback's Infancy

When the first Anti-Kickback Act was passed in 1934,40 it was
passed for reasons that had nothing to do with health care. At the time,
the Davis-Bacon Act required contractors to provide their employees
"prevailing rates" on public works.l' However, to get around this law and
keep wages artificially low, many contractors demanded that their
employees return or "kick back" part of their wages, or else risk losing

37. See Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association,
Conflicts ofInterest: Physician Ownership ofMedical Facilities, 267 J. AM. MED. ASS'N.
2366, 2367 (1992); Statement of Janet L. Shikles, Medicare: Physicians Who Invest in
Imaging Centers Refer More Patients for More Costly Services, Testimony Before the
Subcommittee on Health, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives
(Apr. 1993); Melissa Ahern & Elton Scott, Regional and Individual Differences in
Physician Practices for Joint-Ventured versus Non-Joint-Ventured, 28 HEALTH SERVS.
RESEARCH 6 (Feb. 1994).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2010).
39. Id. at § 1395nn.
40. Copeland Anti-Kickback Act of 1935, 48 Stat. 948, 73rd Cong., Sess. 2 (1934)
(amending and further fortifying the Davis-Bacon Act of 1931).
41. David-Bacon Act of 1931, 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a-276a-5 (1931 ) (defining 'prevailing
rates' as the prevailing or the most common wages received by other laborers performing
similar duties on projects of similar character in the same locality. Now re-codified as 40
U.S.C. §§ 3141-3148).
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their jobs." In response to this behavior, Congress enacted the AntiKickback Act, imposing a fine and/or imprisonment on anyone that
required an employee on a public works project "to give up any part of
the compensation to which [he was] entitled to under ... contract.v" By
further amendment in 1935, a contractor who failed to pay 'prevailing
wages' could also become ineligible to bid on public works projects for a
period of up to three years." In 1960, Congress further expanded the
reach of the Anti-Kickback Act to cover all negotiated contracts entered
into with any agency or department of the United States."

2. Adapting to Medicare and Medicaid - The 1970 's
In 1965, Congress created the Medicare and Medicaid programs."
Instead of creating both programs as government-run national health
insurance programs similar to those in Europe, President Lyndon B.
Johnson's administration and Congress opted to create them with an
infrastructure similar to private insurance companies of that time." Both
Medicare and Medicaid were "to replicate the reimbursement
mechanisms of traditional third-party insurance.v" As such, both plans
"allowed health care providers ... to nominate private companies as gobetweens in dealing with the Social Security Administration." These
private companies became depositories of federal monies earmarked for
these programs and were then tasked to make payments to each
participating health care provider on a fee-for-service basia" As a result,
"the federal government surrendered direct control of [Medicare and
Medicaid] and [their associated] costs.?"

42. Investigation of the Relationship Existing Between Certain Contractors and
Their Employees in the United States Before S. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 73rd Congo 3
(1934).
43. Copeland Anti-Kickback Act, 18 U.S.C. § 874 (1934).
44. An Act Relating to Rate of Wages for Laborers and Mechanics Employed on
Public Buildings, Pub. L. No. 403 § 1, 74th Congo Sess. 3303 (1935) (amending DavisBacon Act).
45. 41 U.S.C. §§ 51-54 (1960).
46. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (1965).
47. J. STUART SHOWALTER, THE LAW OF HEALTHCARE ADMINISTRATION 41 (Health
Administration Press, 7th ed. 2015).
48. Tamsen Douglass Love, Note, Toward a Fair and Practical Definition of
"Willfully" in the Medicare/Medicaid AntiKickback Statute, 50 V AND. L. REv. 1029,
1034 (1997) (citing PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
MEDICINE, 375 (Basic Books 1982».
49. National Health Expenditures, supra note 5.

50. Id.
51. Id. at 42.
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With Medicare and Medicaid up and running, Congress soon
realized that Anti-Kickback measures tailored specifically to health care
needed to be put in place to coalesce with both programs. In 1972,
Congress introduced Anti-Kickback legislation as part of several
amendments made to the Social Security Act. 52 This new Anti-Kickback
Statute prohibited a person from:
[F]urnish[ing] items or services to an individual for which
payment is or may be made under this title and who solicits,
offers, or receives any-(l) kickback or bribe in connection with
the furnishing of such items or services or the making or receipt
of such payment, or (2) rebate of any fee or charge for referring
any such individual to another person for the furnishing of such
items or servicesj.j'"
In addition, the Statute provided for penalties in the form of a
misdemeanor with imprisonment for up to a year and/or fines not to
54
exceed $10,000. At that time, Congress clearly stated that the purpose
of the Anti-Kickback Statute was to curtail unethical behavior in the
health care industry and reduce costs to both the Medicare and Medicaid
programs. 55
Thereafter, in 1977, Congress soon realized that the statute required
further improvements, as confusion over what constituted a "bribe" or a
"kickback" arose in the courts. 56 The Senate and House of
Representatives committee reports show that improvements were needed
to "clarify and restructure [existing] provisions . . . which define the
types of fmancial arrangements and conduct to be classified as illegal,"
because the prior provisions had "not proved [to be] adequate
deterrents.t''" As a consequence, Congress reinforced the Anti-Kickback
Statute by enacting three important changes. First, instead of forbidding
'kickbacks,' 'bribes,' or 'rebates,' Congress expanded its language to
prohibit any and all 'remuneration' that is given in exchange for a

52. Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, 242(b), 86 Stat. 1329,
1419 (1972).
53. Id.
54.Id.
55. H.R. REp. No. 92-231 (1971), reprinted in 1972 u.S.C.C.A.N. 4989, 5093.
56. See United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d 1048, 1053-54 (5th Cir. 1979) (reversing
the defendants' convictions because the referral fees a lab paid doctors were not deemed
to be bribes or kickbacks, as there was no showing of corruption or misapplied
government funds under the Anti-Kickback Statute).
57. H.R. REp. No. 95-393 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3088; see also S.
REp. No. 453 (1977).
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referralr" The use of this more generalized language, coupled with
language immediately following stating that it applied to transactions
"directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind,,,59 shows
Congress's intent for the statute to be far-reaching and applicable to a
greater number of incidences. Second, due to the fraudulent activity
already taking place within the Medicare and Medicaid programs,
Congress enacted stiffer penalties by upgrading all violations to felonies
punishable by a fine, not to exceed $25,000, and/or imprisonment, not to
exceed five years." Third, Congress provided for an additional remedy
by disallowing participation in Medicare or Medicaid if a health care
provider was found guilty of violating any of its provisions."
Another interesting feature of this amendment is what is seen by
some as the beginnings of a carving-out of exceptions in response to the
broad application of the statute. Specifically, the 1977 amendment
provided for two exceptions. The statute did not apply when "a discount
or other reduction in price [was] obtained by a provider of services or
other entity . . . if the reduction in price was properly disclosed and
appropriately reflected in the costs claimed or charges made.,,62 The
statute also was not applicable to "any amount paid by an employer to an
employee (who has a bona fide employment relationship with such
employer) for employment in the provision of covered items or
services.,,63
3. Further Building Blocks: Mens Rea and Safe Harbors - The
1980's

Now that the Anti-Kickback Statute was more expansive in its reach,
many health care providers complained of inadvertently violating the
Anti-Kickback Statute." To address these concerns, Congress enacted
the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980.65 In the Act, "Congress
actually narrowed the scope of the Anti-Kickback Statute by adding a
mens rea requirement that changed the law from a strict liability
58. Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95142,91 Stat. 1183 (1977).
.

59.Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62.Id.
63. Id.
64. TIMOTHY STOLTZ JOST & SHARON L. DAVIES, THE LAW OF MEDICARE AND
MEDICAID FRAUO ANDABUSE 100,114-15 (2001-02 ed. 2000).
65. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1980, H.R. REp. No. 96-1167 (1980), reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5526, 5572.

2017]

MACRA AND STARK: HEALTH CARE REFORM

141

provision to one requiring proof that defendants acted 'knowingly arid
willingly' to impose Iiability.t''" On its face, this amendment appeared to
balance out the otherwise harsh aspects of the 1977 amendment.
Nevertheless, health care providers continued to complain about the
Anti-Kickback Statute, arguing that the terms 'knowingly and willfully'
were ambiguous." Congress appeared to have listened. In a Senate
Report, Congress stated that "the breath of ... statutory language [had]
created uncertainty among health care providers as to which commercial
arrangements are legitimate, and which are proscribed.Y'' As a
consequence, Congress made further amendments by enacting the
69
Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987. In
the statute, Congress empowered the Office of Inspector General (OIG)
of the Health and Human Services Department to impose civil
administrative penalties in addition to the criminal penalties already in
existence." It also carved out two additional exceptions that helped
define acts that were not considered a violation of the statute. First, it
mandated that the Secretary of Health and Human Services, in
conjunction with the Attorney General, "promulgate final regulations,
specifying payment practices that shall not be treated as a criminal
offense.?" This mandate led to the birth of "safe harbors" which would
inform providers about the types of conduct that would be permissible
under the statute." Second, the statute created another exception for "any
amount paid by a vendor ... to a person authorized to act as a purchasing
agent for a group of individuals or entities who are furnishing services
reimbursed under a Federal health care program if the person has a
written contract [and] ... specifies the amount to be paid.?"

66. Dayna Bowen Matthew, Tainted Prosecution of Tainted Claims: The Law,
Economics, and Ethics ofFighting Medical Fraud Under the Civil False Claims Act, 76
IND. L.J. 525, 569 (2001).
67. See Corbin Santo, Note, Walking a Tightrope: Regulating Medicare Fraud and
Abuse and the Transition to Value-Based Payment, 64 CASE W. REs. 1377, 1387 (2014)
(noting ambiguity caused health care providers to be hesitant about "forming new
business and payment arrangements out of fear that they would face criminal liability or
exclusion from Medicare").
68. S. REp. No. 100-109 (1987), reprinted in 1987 V.S.C.CAN. 682, 707-08.
69. Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No.
100-93, §§ 4 & 14, 101 Stat. 680, 688-89, 697-98 (1987) (codified as amended at 42
V.S.C. § 1320a-7b (1995)).
70. Id. at § 3.
71. Id. at § 14.
72. Id.
73. Id. at § 4.
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4. The Birth ofthe Advisory Opinion - The 1990 's

By 1996, health care providers continued to lodge complaints
regarding the Anti-Kickback Statute's lack of clarity. In a House of
Representative Report, even Congress admitted to the continuing
problem by stating:
Providers want to comply with the fraud and abuse statute, but
many are unsure of how the statute affects them. These providers
should be able to receive guidance from. the government
regarding financial arrangements. Little or no guidance is
currently provided because there are no regulations and only
insufficient safe.harbors. Without this ability, a chilling effect is
placed on legitimate arrangementsj.]"
Thus, this same year, Congress enacted the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA).75 Although the
primary goal of HIPAA was to institute safeguards "to protect the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of electronic protected health
information't" and "ensure that individuals who are already sick can
keep insurance even if they lose or leave jobs,,,n it also made important
changes to the fraud and abuse laws. Through its enactment, HIPPA: 1)
gave the OIG the ability to impose intermediate sanctions," 2) increased
funding to OIG and the FBI for fraud enforcement," 3) expanded
sanctions for fraud and abuse,8o and 4) made the Anti-Kickback Statute
applicable to all federal programs." In addition, HIPPA directed the
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services to establish a
'risk-sharing arrangements' exception taking into account, amongst other
74. H.R. REp. No. 104-496, at 84-85 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1865,
18884-85.
75. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (1996).
76. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Health Information Privacy, Q
& A: Why is the HIPAA Security Rule Needed and What is the Purpose of the Security
Standards?, http://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/2000/why-is-hipaa-neededand-what-is-the-purpose-of-security-standards/index.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2016).
77. Kennedy, Kassebaum Steer Insurance Bill to Safety, 54 Congo Q. 2197 (Aug. 3,
1996).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 1395mm(i)(I) (2016).
79. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 1936, Title
II-Preventing Health Care Fraud and Abuse; Administrative Simplification; Medical
Liability Reform, § 201, 110 Stat. at 1994 (1996).
80. Id. at §§ 211-18 (1996).
81. Id. at § 204 (1999).
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factors, the extent to which risk-sharing arrangements provide incentives
to control the cost and quality of health care services.V
Notwithstanding these changes, many would argue that the most
important change brought about by the 1996 amendment to the AntiKickback Statute was the mandate for advisory opinions." According to
the amendment, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services, along with the Attorney General, shall issue advisory opinions
regarding what constitutes a prohibited remuneration, whether an
arrangement is a prohibited arrangement, what constitutes an inducement
to reduce or limit services to beneficiaries, and whether any activity
constitutes grounds for the imposition of sanctions.f" The amendment
clearly stated what topics were not subject to advisory opinions, such as
the fair market value of a good, service, or property; and whether an
individual was a bona fide employee." The amendment also stated that
advisory opinions would only be binding on the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services and on the party or parties
requesting the opinion.f
Lastly, the amendment called for the Inspector General to issue
"special fraud alerts" for the purpose of notifying the public of practices
believed to be suspect or of particular concern regarding the
administration of the Medicare or Medicaid programs.V All special fraud
alerts are to be published in the Federal Registrar and warn of the
consequences of any of the actions that were the subject of the alert."
By 1999, twelve years after the 1987 amendments to the AntiKickback Statute mandated the creation of safe harbors, the OIG
published final regulations clarifying the safe harbors initially
promulgated and creating an additional eight safe harbor provisions." By
1999, there were "a total of 23 Anti-Kickback safe harbors consolidated
in the Code of Federal Regulations?" At first glance, the existence of
twenty-three safe harbors may have led many to believe that the Office
of Inspector General was providing valuable and significant input

82. Id. at § 216, 110 Stat. at 2007--08 (1996).
83. Id. at § 205(b)(I), 110 Stat. at 2001 (1996).
84.Id.
85. Id. at § 205(b)(3), 110 Stat. at 2002 (1996).
86. Id.
87. Id. at § 205( c), 110 Stat. at 2003 (1996).
88. Id.
89. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Medicare and State Health Care Programs:
Fraud and Abuse; Clarification of the Initial OIG Safe Harbor Provisions and
Establishment of Additional Safe Harbor Provisions Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, 64
Fed. Reg. 63518 (Nov. 19, 1999).
90. Id.
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regarding permissible activities under the Anti-Kickback Statute."
However, critics claim that, because the safe harbors are narrowly drawn
and strictly construed, "very few arrangements will be completely
protected. ,,92

5. The Affordable Care Act's Much Needed "Shot in the Arm" - The
2000's
The passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(ACA) in 2010 resulted in significant changes, further strengthening the
Anti-Kickback Statute." First, the ACA amended the Anti-Kickback
Statute by stating that "claims submitted in violation of the [AntiKickback] statute automatically constitute false claims for purposes of
the False Claims Act.,,94 To ensure that health care providers will not
claim that they unknowingly violated the law, they are required to certify
that they comply with all applicable laws, including the Anti-Kickback
Statute, before receiving reimbursements from Medicare and Medicaid."
CMS has made it very clear that the Anti-Kickback Statute was
"designed to prevent or ameliorate fraud, waste and abuse.,,96 Federal
regulations require providers to file cost reports on an annual basis on or
before the last day of the fifth month following the close of the period
covered by the cost report." In these reports, providers are to certify that
they are "familiar with the laws and regulations regarding the provision

91. Timothy J. Aspinwall, The Anti-Kickback Statute Standards of Intent: The Case
for a Rule ofReason Analysis, 9 ANN. HEALTH L. 155, 163 (2000) (citing Scott J. Kelly,
Comment, The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996: A Medicare
Advisory Opinion Mandate Sends the Inspector General "Shopping for Hats", 59 OHIO
ST. L.J. 303, 313 (1998) (citing Hugh E. Aaron, Application of the Medicare and
Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute to Business Arrangements Between Hospitals and
Hospital-Based Physicians, 1 ANNALS HEALTHL. 53, 63 (1992)).
92. Id.
93. Patient Protection and Affordable Health Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g) (2016); see also Scott Oswald and David Scher, Health
Care Law Expands False Claims Act Under the Anti-Kickback Statute (May 2012),
employmentlawgroupblog.com/up-content/Anti-Kickback-statute-false-claimslawyers.pdf.
95. 42 C.F.R. § 424.516(a)(1) (2016):
CMS enrolls and maintains an active enrollment status for a provider or
supplier when that provider or supplier certifies that it meets, and continues
to meet, and CMS verifies that it meets, and continues to meet, . . .
[c]ompliance with title XVIII of the [Social Security] Act and applicable
Medicare regulations.
!d.
96. 42 C.F.R. § 422.504(h) (2016).
97. Id. at § 413.24(f) (2016).
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of health care services, and that the services identified in this cost report
were provided in compliance with such laws and regulations.r'"
Unfortunately, what the 1987 amendment to the Anti-Kickback
Statute gave (the addition of the "knowingly and willfully" intent
requirement to prove a violation), the ACA stripped away. Prior to the
passage of the ACA, a widespread disagreement existed amongst the
courts regarding the meaning of the term "knowingly and willfully." The
Eleventh Circuit promulgated an expansive and traditional interpretation
of the "knowingly and willfully" standard by holding that ignorance of
the law is not a defense, and that all that had to be proven is knowledge
that the conduct was unlawful." In contrast, the Ninth Circuit took a
more narrow approach by holding that the "knowingly and willfully"
standard was met if a defendant knew his conduct was a violation of the
Anti-Kickback Statute and participated in the conduct with the "specific
intent" to violate the statute.l'" Ultimately, the ACA clarified the court
split and sided with the Eleventh Circuit. 101 Federal prosecutors no
longer need to prove that a health care provider specifically intended to
violate the Anti-Kickback Statute. 102 Instead, they only need to prove that
the health care provider intended to violate the law. 103 Specifically, the
ACA states "a person need not have actual knowledge of ... or sgecific .
intent to commit a violation of [the Anti-Kickback Statute.]'" 4 This
definition of what constitutes intent under the Anti-Kickback Statute
effectively lowers the threshold of proof. Some argue that "[t]his new
standard will impact transactions and arrangements counseling and could
potentially create significant criminal and civil fraud exposure for
transactions and arrangements where there is no intent to violate the

98. Id. at § 413.24(f)(4) (2016).
99. United States v. Starks, 157 F.3d 833,838-39 (lIth Cir. 1998) (citing in support
Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184 (1998».
100. Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390, 1399-1400 (9th Cir. 1995).
101. 442 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(h)(2016).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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statute.,,105 Others argue that, in all practically, it eliminates the mens rea
requirement.i'" returning the Anti-Kickback Statute to its pre-1987 state.
Lastly, the ACA further strengthened the Anti-Kickback Statute by
increasing the type of sentences violators of the statute receive. The ACA
mandated that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines be amended "to
provide that the aggregate dollar amount of fraudulent bills submitted to
the Government health care program' shall constitute prima facie
evidence of the amount of the intended loss by the defendant.,,107 It also
mandated that the Federal Sentencing Guidelines provide for the
following enhanced health care fraud sentences: "if ... [a] defendant [is]
convicted of a Federal health care offense involving a Government health
care program and . . . the loss [is] more than $1,000,000, increase
by 2 levels; more than $7,000,000, increase by 3 levels; or more than
$20,000,000, increase by 41evels."lo8
6. From Humble Beginnings to a Power House Statute - The AntiKickback Statute Today
Due to the numerous amendments that have broadened its
application and increased penalties for its violation, the Anti-Kickback
Statute has proven to be a valuable tool in the fight against fraud and
abuse. Today, the statute reads as follows:
Whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any
remuneration [and knowingly and willfully offers or pays
remuneration] (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) directly
or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind (A) for
referring an individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging
for the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may
be made in whole or in part under a Federal health care program,
or (B) ... for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or arranging for or
105. Elizabeth R. Sheyden, Toward a Specific Intent Requirement in White Collar
Crime Statutes: How the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 0/2010 Sheds Light
on the "General Intent Revolution", 64 FLA. L. REv. 449, 465 (2012) (citing Kathleen
McDennott et al., New Health care Fraud and Abuse and Program Integrity Provisions:
Let's Fasten Our Seat Belts/or the Bumpy Ride, AHLA CONNECTIONS, at 13 (May 2010),
available
at
www.healthlawyers.orgINews/Connections/CurrentIssuelDocuments/2010%20FeatureslF
eature_May 10.pdf).

106. Id.
107. Patient Protection and Affordable Health Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 10606
(2010).
108. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANuAL § 2Bl.1.b.8 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N
2011).
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recommending purchasing, leasing, or 'ordering any good,
facility, service, or item for which payment may be made in
whole or in part under a Federal health care program, shall be
guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not
more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or
both. 109
To assist health care providers in its application, a total of twentyfive safe harbors have been issued by the Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services to date.!" In addition, The Office of
Inspector General has issued a total of 369 advisory opinions.!" Most of
these. advisory opinions are new opinions.i" while others are
modifications to or terminations of prior opinions.!" The Office of
Inspector General has also issued a total of thirty-two special fraud
alerts.!"
Numerous awards or settlements have been obtained by the
government from individuals and entities in violation of the AntiKickback Statute and, consequently, the False Claims Act. For example,
in United States ex rei. Gale v. Omnicare, the defendant agreed to pay
over $120 million for providing illegal discounts to Medicare patients.!"
In United States ex rei. Darita v. C.R.Bard, Inc., the defendant agreed to
pay $48.26 million to settle claims it was paying off health care
providers if they prescribed a specific radiation therapy that was
ultimately paid for by Medicare.l" In United States ex rel. Bingham v.
Hospital Corp. ofAmerica, the defendant agreed to pay $16.5 million to
dismiss charges that it paid money and other valuable consideration to
physicians in exchange for patient referrals. 117 Similarly, in United States
109. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2016) (emphasis added).
110. 42 C.F.R. § 1001.952 (2016).
111. Advisory Opinions, Office ofInspector General, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
AND HUMAN SERVICES, http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/advisory-opinions/index.asp (last
visited Aug. 21, 2016).

112. See id.
113. See id.
114. Special Fraud Alerts, Office of the Inspector General, U. S. DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/alerts/guidance/index.asp
(last visited Aug. 18, 2016).
115. United States ex reI. Donald Gale v. Omnicare, Inc., No. l:lOCVI27, 2013 WL
3822152, (N.D. Ohio Sept. 26, 2012).
116. Office of Public Affairs, Department of Justice, C. R. Bard. Inc. To Pay u.s.
$48.26 Million To Resolve False Claim Act Claims (May 13, 2013),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/cr-bard-inc-pay-us-4826-million-resolve-false-c1aims-actclaims.
117. Office of Public Affairs, Department of Justice, Hospital Chain HCA Inc. Pays

$16.5 Million to Settle False Claims Act Allegations Regarding Chattanooga. Tenn.,
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ex rei. Health Dimensions Rehabilitation v. RehabCare Group, the
defendant paid $30 million to dismiss a lawsuit that alleged the
defendant made payments with the intent of inducing use of its therapy
services. I IS These cases are just a representative sample of the type of
abuse and fraud the federal government has been able to combat by
virtue of the Anti-Kickback Statute. Even though critics of the AntiKickback Statute claim it is too broad and far reaching, with an intent
requirement that has, for all practical purposes, been eradicated by the
ACA, it does beg the question, what would be the current state of fraud
and abuse in the health care industry if the Anti-Kickback Statute did not
exist?
B. The Stark Law
1. An Additional Tool in Fighting Fraud and Abuse - "Stark I"

The Ethics in Patient Referrals Act of 1989 (Stark I) was introduced
in the House of Representatives by Representative Fortney H. "Pete"
Stark from California.l'" It subsequently was enacted by Congress and
included in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989.120 Stark I
barred a physician from referring patients to a clinical laboratory in
which the physician had an interest if the costs of the laboratory services
were to be paid by the Medicare program. 121 It became effective in
1992.122 Final regulations were not released until August of 1995.123
Prior to the passage of Stark I, several Congressional hearings took
place detailing numerous accounts of physician self-referrals financed by
Medicare. For example, a 1983 study was introduced in Congress that
compared the price and usage of twenty doctor-owned labs and twenty
independent labs.124 In this study, the average payment made to the
Hospital (Sept. 19, 2012), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/hospital-chain-hca-inc-pays165-million-settle-fa1se-claims-act-allegations-regarding.
118. Office of Public Affairs, Department of Justice, Nationwide Contract Therapy
Providers to Pay $30 Million to Resolve False Claims Act Allegations (Jan. 17, 2014),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/nationwide-contract-therapy-providers-pay-30-millionresolve-false-claims-act-allegations.
119. Ethics in Patient Referrals Act of 1989, H.R. 939, 101st Congo (1989).
120. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, H.R. 3299, 101st Congo (1989).
121. !d.
122. Andrew B. Wachler & Adrienne Dresevic, Stark II Phase III - "The Full
Picture", THE HEALTH LAWYER, ABA HEALTH LAW SECTION 3 (Sept. 2007),
http://www.thehealthlawpartners.com/files/stark2-phase3_thefullpicture. pdf.
123. 60 Fed. Reg. 41923 (1995).
124. Physician Self-Referral Problem: The Evidence Increases, 135 CONGo REc. e61O,
(1989).
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doctor-owned labs was $44.82 and the average number of tests
performed per patient was 6.23. 125 Conversely, in the independent labs,
the average payment made to the lab was $25.48 and the average number
of tests performed per patient was 3.76. 126 Further, anecdotal evidence
was introduced showing how physicians were acquiring joint venture
interests in laboratories and substantially profiting by making referrals to
them. 127 While "[t]he American Medical Association [stated] only about
7% of American physicians are involved in such ventures, [0]ther health
care authorities estimate[d] it [was] closer to 25%.,,128 Testimony was
presented which showed that, in the end, "physicians [held] shares or
limited-partnership interests in medical facilities that provide 'tens of
billions of dollars' a year in services.,,129
Moreover, in May of 1989, the Office of the Inspector General
issued a report regarding the inter-relationship between physician joint
ventures and the already escalating costs in the Medicare program.l'"
Amongst the report's findings was the fact that "patients of referring
physicians who own or invest in independent clinical laboratories
received 45 percent more clinical laboratory services" than Medicare
patients whose physicians did not own or invest in clinical
laboratories. 131 As a consequence of these staggering figures, physician
self-referral appeared in the headlines of several major news outlets. 132
There was a sense of urgency at the time. Ultimately, the purpose in
enacting Stark I was two-fold: to stop over-utilization of medical services
and to remove the. conflict of interest inherent in physician selfreferral. 133

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
!d.
Id.
Id.

130. Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,

Financial Arrangements Between Physicians and Health Care Businesses, OAI-12-8801410 (May 1989).
131. Id.
132. Robert P. Hey & Barbara Bradley, $450 Billion Industry Spawns Fraud,
Abuse, CHRISTIAN SCI,MONITOR, Dec. 7, 1988; Robert P. Hey & Barbara Bradley, MD's
Investments Reap Controversial Profits, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 8, 1988; Robert
P. Hey & Barbara Bradley, Patient Care vs. Physicians' Investments, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Dec. 12,1988; Michael Waldholz & Walt Bogdanich, Doctor-Owned Labs
Earn Lavish Profits in a Captive Market, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 1989; Robert Pear & Erik
Eckholm, When Healers Are Entrepreneurs: A Debate Over Costs and Ethics, N.Y.
TIMES, June 2, 1991, at AI.
133. SHOWALTER, supra note 47, at 538.
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When enacted in 1989, Stark I only prohibited a physician from
referring Medicare patients to clinical laboratories in which the physician
had a financial relationship.l" Specifically, it stated:
[I]f a physician (or immediate family member of such physician)
has a financial relationship with an entity, the physician may not
make a referral to the entity for the furnishing of clinical
laboratory services for which payment otherwise may be made
under this title, and ... the entity may not present or cause to be
presented a claim under this title . . . for clinical laboratory
services furnished pursuant to a [prohibited referral]. 135
It provided four exceptions; namely, Stark I did not apply: 1) if a
referral was made by a physician to another physician in the same group
practice; 2) if a referral was made for in-office ancillary services; 3) if a
referral was made within a pre-paid plan; and 4) in any other financial
relationship that the Secretary of Health and Human Services believes
does not pose a risk of harm to the Medicare program or to the patient. 136
It is important to note that, from the outset, Stark I emerged as a
strict liability law. This means that "a health care provider's good faith
intent to comply with the law, and any lengths the provider may go to
attempt to comply, are irrelevant.v" In other words, "regardless of how
analytically difficult a Stark issue may be, and regardless [of] how many
reputable law firm opinions a health care provider may obtain, a Stark
violation is a Stark violation.,,138
In addition, the magnitude of a violation is irrelevant. Stark makes no
distinction between minor or technical violations (such as "unintentional
acts, like forgetting to sign a contract, allowing a contract to expire
without renewal, or unintentionally omitting an element of an exception
from the agreement'{"), and more substantive violations the law was
designed to prevent (such as "failure to have certain financial
134. Physician Self-Referral, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/MedicarelFraud-and-AbuselPhysicianSeltReferral/index.html (last
visited Aug. 18,2016).
135. Omnibus and Reconciliation Act of 1989, 101 Pub. L. No. 239, 103 Stat. 2106
(1989).
136. !d.
137. Alan
Rumph,
Why
Stark
Answers?,
STARK
ANSWERS.COM,
http://www.starkanswers.com/Why-StarkAnswers.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2016).
138. Id.
139. Holly Carnell & Anna Timmerman, Expensive Mistakes: Preventing Technical
Violations O/The Stark Law, E-Briefings, 11 THEGOVERNANCE INSTITUTE 2 (May 2014),
available at https://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-resources/publicationslExpensiveMistakes-Preventing-Violations-Stark-Law.pdf.
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relationships with physicians memorialized 'pursuant to a written
agreement, calculating a physician's salary or bonus based on referral
volume, or leasing office space to a physician below fair market
value,,14o). Thus, the magnitude of the violation does not matter as "even
'technical' violations can result in large penalties for providers.v'"
Many commentators have had the opportunity to discuss the reasons
Congress found it imperative to enact Stark I notwithstanding the fact
that the Anti-Kickback Statute had been in existence for more than
seventeen years. Some critics claim that:
At the time Stark [I] was enacted, the government's ability to use
the Anti-Kickback statute to regulate inappropriate influences on
a physician's referrals was limited by several factors. At that
time, there was no civil liability for Anti-Kickback violations
under the Civil Money Penalty (CMP) statute, and the
government was not sure that it could use an Anti-Kickback
violation as a predicate for a Federal Claims Act case.
Government enforcement agencies were looking for a non-intent
.based statute and [Stark I] filled that need. 142
As will be shown later in this paper, many of the reasons why Stark
was initially enacted no longer exist.

2. The Advent ofa Bigger and Better Stark - "Stark II"
After the enactment of Stark I, Congress remained interested in
monitoring physicians and their investment interests as well as the
increased costs to the Medicare program. Several reports were written
and testimonies were given in Congress further detailing the magnitude
of the problem. In a 1993 report, the United States General Accounting
Office provided testimony and supporting data regarding the impact of
physician referrals to imaging centers physicians either owned or had an
interest in.143 The report noted, with great detail, that "physician owners
of Florida diagnostic imaging facilities had higher referral rates for all

140. Id.
Id.
142. A Public Policy Discussion: Taking the Measure a/The Stark Law, AM. HEALTH
LAWYERS
ASS'N
PuB. INTEREST COMM.
8
(2009),
available
at
https://www.healthlawyers.org/hlresources/PI/ConvenerSessionslDocurnents/Stark%20W
hite%20Paper.pdf.
141.

143. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTABILITY. OFF., GAO/T-HRD-93-14, PHYSICIANS WHO INVEST
IN IMAGINGCENTERS REFER MORE PATIENTSFOR MOST COSTLY SERVICES3-7 (1993).
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types of imaging services than [non-ownersj.v'T' Specifically, the report
found "the differences in referral rates were greatest for costly, high
technology imaging services: . . . [physician] owners had 54 percent
higher referral rates for MRI scans, 28 percent higher referral rates for
computed tomography (CT) scans, and 25 percent higher referral rates
for ultrasound and echocardiography.v" Ultimately, because the
findings of the study were significant, the report went on to state that the
General Accounting Office believed this new information was important
to Congress "as it considers legislation to extend current restrictions on
physician self-referral.t'r'"
With data of this magnitude in the hands of Congress, it is not
surprising that the wheels were put in motion to further expand Stark I
with the passage of Stark II as part of The Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993.147 Stark II expanded the physician selfreferral prohibition to a number of health services other than clinical
laboratories.l" Specifically, Stark II prohibited physicians (and members
of their immediate family) from referring Medicare and Medicaid
patients for "designated health services" to entities in which they had a
financial relationship.l'" The term "designated health services" was new
to the statute and it included a rather long list of services to which this
prohibition applied (i.e., clinical laboratory services; physical therapy
services; occupational therapy services; radiology services; radiation
therapy services and supplies; durable medical equipment and supplies;
parenteral and enteral nutrients, equipment and supplies; prosthetics,
orthotics, and prosthetic devices' and supplies; home health services;
outpatient prescription drugs; and inpatient and outpatient hospitalization
services).150 As in Stark I, Stark II also prohibited submitting a claim for
payment if the services furnished were pursuant to a prohibited Stark II
referral.P' It further expanded its reach by making itself applicable to the
Medicaid program, toO. 152 Lastly, it made some important refinements to
the overall wording of Stark I and its exceptions.l'"

144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312
(1993).
148. See id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. See id.
153. !d.
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Interestingly, regulations for Stark I were not published until August
14, 1995,154 two years after the enactment of Stark II. Even though "the
Stark I final rule technically applied only to referrals for Clinical
laboratory services . . . , it was assumed [by health care providers] to
apply in large part to [the] other [designated health care services]"!"
already designated in Stark II.
3. The Many Moons of "Stark II"

Regulations for Stark II were released in three principal phases
known as Phase I, Phase II, and Phase III. After much public comment,
Phase I of the regulations (known as Stark II, Phase I) was released on
January 4, 2001.J56 Phase I "revise[d] the definition of referral, clarifie[d]
what
constitutes an indirect
fmancial
relationship,
[and]
add[ed] an exception for indirect compensation arrangements and
exempts entities who do not know the identity of the referring
physician.,,157 It also clarified the defmition of several key terms such as
"physician," "referring physician," "entity," "immediate family
member," "referral," and "consultation, amongst others.,,158 Defining
these key terms, whether advertently or inadvertently, gave eMS the
opportunity to further expand the reach of Stark II. Phase I also created
"new general exceptions for academic medical centers; implants in
ambulatory surgery centers; certain drugs furnished in or by an end-stage
renal disease facility; preventive screening tests and immunizations; and
eyeglasses and contact lenses following cataract surgery.,,159
The final regulations for Stark II, Phase II were released on March
26, 2004. 160 When Stark II, Phase II was released, it merged with Stark
II, Phase I and, together, superseded the prior Stark I regulations.l'" The
Phase II fmal rule "provide[d] some limited relief for 'technical
violations'" by creating new exceptions for temporary lapses in
compliance, professional courtesy, community information systems,
intra-family referrals, Anti-Kickback safe harbors, and charitable

154. 60 Fed. Reg. 41923 (1995).
155. Wachler, supra note 122, at 3.
156. 66 Fed. Reg. 856 (2001).
157. Andrew B. Wachler & Adrienne Dresevic, Stark II Final Rule-Phase I: A Kinder
and Gentler Stark?, THE HEALTH LAWYER, ABA HEALTH LAW SECTION (Jan. 2001).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. 69 Fed. Reg. 16054 (2004).
161. Andrew B. Wachler, Adrienne Dresevic & Karen K. Harris, Stark II Phase 11The Final Voyage, THE HEALTH LAWYER, ABA HEALTH LAW SECTION (Apr. 2004),
http://www.wachler.com/files/stark_ii-phase_ii_the_final_voyage.pdf.
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donations. 162 It broadened the exception for academic centers and
permissible compensation arrangements.l'" It also revised the physician
recruitment exception and the in-office ancillary services exception.!'"
The Stark II, Phase III fmal rule was released on September 5,
2007 165 and, with it, the rule-making process for the regulations that
would interpret and implement Stark II was over. In Phase III, further
limited relief was provided for technical violations.l'" The physician
recruitment exception was relaxed and the definition of "physician in
group practice" was narrowed.l'" Additionally, in determining whether a
physician has e financial relationship with an entity, the final rule stated
that the physician will stand in the shoes of his physician organization.l'"
Moreover, several definitions and exceptions were also clarified based on
the public comment received prior to the rules release. 169 According to
CMS, Phase I, II, and III would now be read together as a unified
whole. l7 O
To assist with the complexities of all three phases of the Stark fmal
regulations, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) is
empowered to issue written advisory opinions.!" Specifically, CMS shall
"issue written advisory opinions concerning whether a referral relating to
designated health services (other than clinical laboratory services) is
prohibited under this section.,,172 Similar to the advisory opinions
available to those with questions about the Anti-Kickback Statute, each
advisory opinion regarding application of Stark shall be "issued by the
Secretary [and] shall be binding as to the Secretary and the party or
parties requesting the opinion."!" Presently, CMS has issued a total of
thirty advisory opinions pursuant to this provision.i" Half of those
162. See Carnell, supra note 139, at 2.
163. See 69 Fed. Reg. 16054 (2004).
164. See id.
165. 72 Fed. Reg. 51012 (2007).
166. See Carnell, supra note 139, at 3.
167. Id.; see also Patricia S. Hofstra & Neville M. Bilimoria, The New Stark Rules:
What Does Stark II, Phase III Mean for Health care Providers, MEDICAL PRACTICE
MANAGEMENT
(Mar.!Apr.
2008),
http://www.duanemorris.com/articles/static/medpracmgmt0508.pdf.
168. See Hofstra, supra note 167, at 300.
169. Id.
170. Wachler, supra note 122, at 3.The final rules are codified at 42 C.F.R § 411.350411.389 (2007).
171. Social Security Act § 1877(g)(6), 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2016).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Physician Self-Referral Advisory Opinions, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID
SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Fraud-andAbuselPhysicianSeltReferral/advisory_opinions.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2016).

2017]

MACRA AND STARK: HEALTH CARE REFORM

155

opimons pertain to the application of Stark to unique facts and
circumstances that have emerged within the health care industry. 175 The
other half of the opinions apply to the specialty hospital moratorium that
took place from December 2003 to June 2005. 176
Since the release of Stark II, Phase III, there have not been any
further rulemaking procedures to amend Stark. However, CMS has found
a different way to amend Stark as health care reform continues to move
forward. For the first time ever, in August of 2006, CMS made use of its
annual update to the Physician Fee Schedule to address Stark's in-office
ancillary services exception.!" Amending Stark through the Physician
Fee Schedule "allows the agency to avoid the cumbersome process of
omnibus rulemaking.v'" Consequently, since the 2006 Physician Fee
Schedule, CMS has introduced changes to Stark in almost every
subsequent yearly update.'?" Thus, based on this recent history, it is
reasonable to anticipate that future amendments to Stark will continue to
be made in this manner.
Few would disagree that Stark has become .increasingly complex
over the years. It seems that with Congress's good faith attempt to clarify
the statute via amendment, new ambiguities and complexities have been
created. Even former Representative Fortney "Pete" Stark has been
quoted as saying that "he would favor repealing the law as it currently
exists and getting back to the law's initial intent.,,180 Mr. Stark laments
the current complexities of the statute and claims "those complications
were added by high-priced lawyers who tried to build loopholes for their
clients.,,181 Instead, Mr. Stark reiterates that the law was meant to go after
people "who are soliciting referrals, and offering kickbacks and special
rates.,,182
Unfortunately, the current Stark Law does more than just go after
those "who are soliciting referrals and offering kickbacks and special
rates." It reads as follows:

175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Robert C. Homchick & Kim Harvey Looney, Back to the Drafting Table: How
Has Changed Contracting Risks. AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS'N 3,
https://www.healthlawyers.org/events/programs/materials/documents/phy12/papers/o_ho
mchick_Iooney.pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 2016).

Stark

178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Joe Carlson, Pete Stark: Repeal the Stark Law, VITAL SIGNS (Aug. 2, 2013),
http://www.modemhealthcare.com/article/20 130802/blog/308029995.
181. Id.
.

182. Id.
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(l). . . [I]f a physician (or an immediate family member of such
physician) has afinancial relationship with an entity ... , then(A) the physician may not make a referral to the entity for the
furnishing of designated health services for which payment
otherwise may be made under this subchapter, and
(B) the entity may not present or cause to be presented a claim
under this subchapter or bill to any individual, third party payor,
or other entity for designated health services furnished pursuant
to a [prohibited]referral . . .(2)For purposes of this section, a
financial relationship of a physician (or an immediate family
member of such physician) with an entity specified in this
paragraph is(A) ... an ownership or investment interest in the entity, or
(B) ... a compensation arrangement between the physician (or
an
immediate family member of such physician) and the
entity. 183
On its face, it goes beyond its original intent of punishing physicians
who have an ownership or interest in an entity to which it refers
Medicare and Medicaid patients by delving into the physician
compensation arena. By inserting physician compensation arrangements
into the statute's definition of "fmancial relationship," some critics argue
that Congress went beyond the scope of the statute's original intent.l'"
On the other hand, other critics state that this compensation arrangement
prohibition was meant "to prevent the law from being circumvented by
contractual structures that did not involve equity but gave physicians the
benefits of ownership.,,185 Whether outside the scope or not, at the very
least, inclusion of the compensation arrangement prohibition is proof of
the federal government's distrust of physicians.
Although there is a bona fide employment relationship exception that
allows physician compensation arrangements, the exception is laced with
complexity. It reads as follows:
183. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a) (2010) (emphasis added).
184. SENATE FINANCE COMM. MAJORITY STAFF REp.,

Why Stark, Why Now?
Suggestions to Improve the Stark Law to Encourage Innovative Payment Models 4 (June
2016),
http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Stark%20White%20Paper,%20SFC%20M
ajority%20StaffUlo200630 16.pdf.

. 185. Id.
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Any amount paid by an employer to a physician (or an
immediate family member of such physician) who has a bona
fide employment relationship with the employer for the
provision of services if(A) the employment is for identifiable services,
(B) the amount of the remuneration under the employment(i) is consistent with the fair market value of the services, and
(ii) is not determined in a manner that takes into account
(directly or indirectly) the volume or value of any referrals by
the referring physician,
(C) the remuneration is provided pursuant to an agreement which
would be commercially reasonable even if no referrals were
made to the employer, and
(D) the employment meets such other requirements as the
Secretary may impose by regulation as needed to protect against
program or patient abuse. 186
As written, the physician compensation arrangement exception is
dependent on a myriad of fact-dependent elements. Terms such as "fair
market value," "not determined [by] the volume or value of any referral,"
and "commercially reasonable" require that "parties ... prove that their
arrangement fits into the exception at trial" as questions of fact cannot be
resolved in a motion for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss.l'"
This fact-dependent exception places a burden on hospitals, as litigation
is extremely costly and leads to unpredictable outcomes. 188 Legal
practitioners and hospital administrators may feel that they are constantly
walking on minefields each time they enter into a compensation
agreement with a physician because of the degree of ambiguity found in
such terms.
Although CMS would probably never admit to it, its relaxed
enforcement of Stark may be indicative that it finds Stark as
unreasonably complex, ambiguous, and daunting as others in the health
care industry. It may also be indicative that it "lacks the resources to
186. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(b)(e)(2) (2010) (emphasis added).
187. SENATE FINANCE COMM. MAJORITY STAFF REp., supra note 184, at 5.
188. Id. at 17.
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enforce Stark more aggressively.v" Since 1998, CMS has only issued
twenty-eight advisory opinions, with fifteen of these relating to specialty
hospital moratoriums.F" A substantial majority of Stark enforcement
actions are not initiated by CMS, but private whistleblowers.!" From a
random "review of approximately 100 public legal actions involving
allegations of Stark violations, all but two were either initiated or filed by
whistleblowers.v'V In addition, CMS has lagged in addressing Stark
violations via its self-disclosure protocol. By January 12, 2015, for
example, it had "received 529 disclosures" but only resolved 128 of
them.!" These facts combined point to CMS' limited ability to enforce a
very complex law.
4. Comparisons Between the Anti-Kickback Statute and Stark
Many comparisons can be made between the Anti-Kickback Statute
and Stark. When Stark was originally enacted, the Anti-Kickback
Statute's ability to effectively target physician self-referral was
questioned.I'" Representative Stark believed that "the Anti-Kickback
Statute, which . . . require[d] a showing of intent, was too weak to
adequately regulate self-referrals.v" However, the Anti-Kickback
Statute is now more sophisticated than it was in 1989.
Although the table below provides a comparison between the AntiKickback Statute and Stark, several features ofthe Anti-Kickback Statute
are worth highlighting. First, the Anti-Kickback Statute is applicable to
all federal health care programs.l'" whereas Stark is only applicable to
the Medicare and Medicaid programs."? Second, the Anti-Kickback

189. Mark S. Raspanti & Sarah R. Lavelle, Who is Enforcing the Stark Law of the
AHLA
CONNECTIONS
24,
26
(Sept.
2012),
United
States?,
http://www.falseclaimsact.com/wp-contentJuploads/20 13/02/feature_sept20121.pdf.
190. Advisory Opinions, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.govlMedicarelFraud-andAbus~iPhysicianSelfReferra1/advisory
_ opinions.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2016).
19( Raspanti, supra note 189, at 25.
192. Id. at 28.
193. Martin Merritt, CMS Self-Disclosure Protocol: Good Intent, Bad Process,
PHYSICIANS PRACTICE (March 29, 2015), http://www.physicianspractice.com/blog/cmsself-disclosure-protocol-good-intent-bad-process.
194. See generally Irwin "Ham" Wagner, The Difficulty of Doing Business with Stark
in an Ever-Changing and Overly Complex Regulatory Environment: After Twenty Years.
Where Are We Heading?, 19 ANNALS HEALTH L. 241, 243-44 (2010).
195. Nicholas 1. Diamond, Giving Disclosure Its Due: Proposal For Reforming The
Stark Law, 16 DEPAUL 1. HEALTH CARE L. 1,8 (2014).
196. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2010).
197. Id. at § 1395nn (2016).
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Statute's "knowing and willful" intent requirement has been relaxed.i'" It
is now sufficient to prove that defendant "knowingly and willfully"
intended to violate the law; not that defendant "knowingly and willfully"
intended to violate the Anti-Kickback Statute.!" This lowering of the
"knowing and willful" standard has increased the Anti-Kickback
Statute's reach. Third, civil penalties are now available under the AntiKickback Statute in addition to the original criminal penalties.i" Fourth,
violations of the Anti-Kickback Statute can now be prosecuted under the
False Claim ACt,201 Lastly, because the Anti-Kickback Statute prohibits
"offering, paying, soliciting or receiving anything of value to induce or
reward referrals or generate federal health care program business,,,202 the
physician compensation arm of Stark appears redundant as any
remuneration that is tied to the value or volume of business is already an
illegal remuneration under the Anti-Kickback Statute.i'"

198. Id. at § 1320a-7b(h)(201O).
199. Id. (noting that "[w]ith respect to violations of this section, a person need not have
actual knowledge of this section or specific intent to commit a violation of this section.").
200. See Social Security Act § 1128A(a)(7) (2010), 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (2015); see
also § 1128B(b), 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2015). Under the Civil Monetary Penalties
provision, the Office of Inspector General may impose civil penalties for violations of the
Anti-Kickback Statute. The penalties are up to $50,000 per violation plus three times the
amount of the remuneration. Violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute may also lead to
exclusion from Federal health care programs.
201. See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2010).
202. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2015).
203. See Special Fraud Alert: Laboratory Payments to Referring Physician, OFF. OF
TIffi
INSPECTOR
GEN.
(June
25,
2014),
https://oig.hhs.gov/fraudJdocs/alertsandbulletins/2014/OIG_SFA_Laboratory]ayments_
06252014.pdf.
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Comparison of the Anti-Kickback Statute and Stark La~o4

Prohibition

Anti-Kickback Statute
Prohibits offering, paying,
soliciting or receiving anything
of value to induce or reward
referrals or generate Federal
health care program business

Stark
Prohibits a physician from
for
referring
Medicare
patients
designated health services to an entity
with which the physician (or immediate
family member) has a financial
relationship, unless an exception applies
Prohibits the designated health
services entity from submitting claims to
Medicare for those services resulting
from a prohibited referral
Referrals from a physician
Designated health services
• No intent standard for
(strict .
liability)
overpayment
• Intent required for civil monetary
penalties for knowing violations
Civil:
• Overpayment/refund obligation
• False Claims Act liability
• Civil monetary penalties and
knowing
program
exclusion
for
violations
• Potential $15,000 civil monetary
penalties for each service
• Civil assessment of up to three
times the amount claimed

•

•

Referrals
Items/Service
Intent

Referrals from anyone
Any items or services
Intent must be proven
(knowing and willful)

Penalties

Criminal:
• Fines up to $25,000 per
violation
• Up to a 5 year prison
term per violation
Civil/Administrative:
• False Claims Act liability
• Civil monetary penalties
and program exclusion
• Potential $50,000 CMP
per violation
• Civil assessment of up to
three times amount of kickback
All

Federal Health
Care Programs

Medicare/Medicald/"

204. This table is taken directly, and adapted only in part, from the Office ofInspector
General's Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Action Team (HEAT). OFF. OF
ras
INSPECTOR
GEN.,
https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/provider-compliance
trainingifiles/StarkandAKSChartHandout508.pdf (last visited Aug. 21, 2016).
205. Id.
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An important aspect to note regarding the comparison chart above is
that existing penalties under Stark have the potential to be more
draconian than they are under the Anti-Kickback Statute. For example,
"if a hospital has a non-compliant fmancial arrangement with a
physician, all Medicare payments . . . from that physician are
'overpayments' and must be returned, regardless of the amount of the
'tainted' transaction. or nature of the payment.,,206 In contrast, an
application of the Anti-Kickback Statute to the same scenario would
yield to liability "resulting from" the kickback, and thus, arguably more
commensurate to the degree of violation.i'" Although this may be
perceived as an argument in support of retaining the compensation arm
of Stark, the opposite is true. It is impossible for health care providers to
comply with a law that that is unpredictable in its application and
draconian in its enforcement. Under Stark, well-meaning health care
providers are exposed to a degree of liability that goes beyond the scope
of the statute's original intent. In contrast, the Anti-Kickback Statute is
the better tool in protecting against prohibited referrals because, in
addition to yielding penalties that are more commensurate with
violations, it allows for criminal penalties, to0 208-something that Stark
is unable to do. In addition, the Anti-Kickback Statute can result in civil
monetary damages of up to $50,000 per violation, whereas Stark can
only result in civil monetary damages of up to $15,000 per violation.t'"
As of late, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) has taken a keen
interest in physician compensation arrangements. In June of 2015, the
OIG published a fraud alert targeting them. 21O The alert specifically states
that "a compensation arrangement may violate the Anti-Kickback statute
if even one purpose of the arrangement is to compensate a physician for
his or her past or future referrals of Federal health care program
business" and that serious criminal, civil, and administrative penalties
will follow "[t]hose who commit fraud involving Federal health care
programs.v'!' This alert brings to the forefront two important realities.
First, the OIG is intent on spending time and resources investigating
physicians and their compensation agreements. Because the alert makes
206. SENATE FINANCE COMM. MAJORITY STAFF REp., supra note 184, at 5.
207. Id.
208. Table, supra note 204.
209. Id.
210. Office of the Inspector General, Fraud Alert: Physician Compensation
Arrangements May Result in Significant Liability, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES
(June
9,
2015),
http://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/alerts/guidancelFraud_Alert_Physician_Compensation_06
0920 15.pdf.
211. Id.
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reference to the OIG reaching settlements with twelve physicians who
were found to be receiving improper remuneration, it is clear that
physician compensation will continue to be a matter of great scrutiny by
the federal government. 212 Second, the compensation received by the .
twelve physicians highlighted in the alert was deemed an illegal
remuneration under the Anti-Kickback Statute.i" not Stark. There would
have been no additional need to apply Stark inasmuch as violations of the
Anti-Kickback Statute trigger application of the False Claim Act. 214 In
this instance, it appears the federal government chose the Anti-Kickback
Statute as its tool of choice because it provides for a wider array of
penalties than Stark. In this case, Stark was duplicative and unnecessary.
II. THE NATURE OF ALTERNATIVE PAYMENT MODELS AND
MACRA
The American health care system's fee-for-service model has
fostered certain unwanted behaviors while failing to foster other more
desirable ones. First, in a fee-for-service world, health care providers are
encouraged to deliver more services as long as the payment received for
each service exceeds the provider's cost of delivery.215 The practice of
"defensive medicine" has further contributed to this pre-disposition as
health care providers feel forced to deliver more services, not less, as a
shield against lawsuits.i" Compounding this lack of control in the
volume of services delivered is the fact that the fee-for-service model
lacks built-in mechanisms to counteract this behavior and discourage the
delivery of unnecessary services.i" Second, the propensity towards
providing more services fosters an individualistic approach to the
practice of medicine and does not encourage collaboration between
health care professionals.i" In fact, collaboration is usually avoided in
the fee-for-service world as it may decrease the volume of services any

212. Id.
213. Id.
214. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g) (2016).
215. Simon Stevens, Farewell to Fee-Far-Service? A "Real World" Strategy for
Health Care Payment Reform, UNITED HEALTH CTR. FOR HEALTH REFORM &
MODERNIZATION 6 (Dec. 2012).
216. Julie Barnes, Moving Away from Fee-Far-Service, THE ATLANTIC (May 7, 2012),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/05/moving-away-from-fee-forservice/256755/.
217. Id.
218. Why Incentives Matter: Fee for Service, HEALTH CARE INCENTIVES IMPROVEMENT
INST., http://www.hci3.orglthought-leadership/why-incentives-matter/fee-for-service (last
visited Aug. 18,2016).
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given health care professional provides.i" Third, in a fee-for-service
model, paying separate fees to different providers for each individual
service leads to service gaps, duplication of services, and numerous other
service inefficiencies due to the fragmented and uncoordinated nature of
the system. 220 Lastly, payment for health care services is not tied to the
quality of those services.i" In the fee-for-service system, the payment for
a service remains the same regardless of the quality of the service. 222
Thus, health care providers are not held accountable to the original
source of their compensation (i.e. Medicare, Medicaid, private insurance
companies) for the quality, or lack thereof, of the services they provide.
In CMS's own words, under a traditional fee-for-service system" ...
many Medicare payments to providers [are] tied only to volume,
rewarding providers based on how many tests they ran, how many
patients they saw, or how many procedures they did, for example,
regardless of whether these services helped (or harmed) the patient."m
With a mounting body of evidence over the years showing that the
traditional fee-for-service model no longer works, CMS has, in its own
words, poised itself as "[beginning] to transform itself from a passive
payer of services into an active purchaser of higher quality, affordable
care.,,224 As a consequence, during the last decade, CMS has been
experimenting with several alternative payment models and testing them
in different markets across the country. Namely, CMS has instituted the
Medicare Shared Savings (MSSP) Accountable Care Organizations
(ACO), Bundled Payments for Care Improvement (BPCI) Initiative,
Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement Model (CJR), Oncology
Care Model (OCM), End-Stage Renal Disease (ESRD) Quality Incentive
Program (QIO), Pioneer Accountable Care Organization (ACO) Model,
Next Generation ACO Model, and Health Care Innovation Awards
Round Two Demonstration Program, amongst others. 225 Although each
program has its own unique aspects, the one denominator they all have in

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id.
Stevens, supra note 215, at 6.
Id.

Id.

CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 33.
Roadmap for Implementing Value-Driven Health care in the Traditional
Medicare Fee-for-Service Program, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS. 1,
https://www.cms.govlMedicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-AssessmentInstruments/QualityInitiativesGenInfo/DownloadsNBPRoadmap_OEA_1-16_508. pdf
(last visited Aug. 20, 2016).
225. Overview of Select Alternative Payment Models, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND
SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/NewsroomIMediaReleaseDatabase/FactMEDICAID
sheets/2016-Fact-sheets-items/2016-03-03.html (last visited Aug. 18,2016).
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common is that payments are directly tied to the following two
outcomes: quality of care and lower costS.226
While many of these alternative payment models have not been fully
tested, to date, CMS reports several significant results. For example, "in
2014 -alone, Medicare ACOs improved quality and patient experience
markedly over previous years and saved over $411 million for the
program."227 In addition, "the Independence at Home Demonstration
improved quality of care ... and saved $3,000 per Medicare beneficiary
_on average.,,228 Moreover, the Comprehensive Care for Joint
Replacement Model is on track to provide a combined savings of $153
million over five years. 229 These are just a few of the many positive
outcomes that voluntary alternative payment plans have the potential to
achieve. Consequently, the positive results of these programs led the
way, at least in part, to the passage of an across-the-board bill making
quality of care and lower costs factors inextricably tied to all Medicare
payments: the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of
2015 230 (MACRA).
Although the passage of MACRA was well-received by a substantial
majority of health care professional groups.i" it was not well-received
226. Id.
227. Crns. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 33.

228. Id.

229. McDermott & Consulting LLC, Medicare Anno~nces First Mandatory Bundled
Payment Model: Comprehensive Care for Joint Replacement, INSIGHTS (July 14, 2015),
http://www.mcdermottplus.com/news/medicare-announces-first-mandatory-bundledpayment-model-comprehensive-care-for-joint-replacement.
230. Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 116-10,
129 Stat. 87 (2015).
231. Greg Phillips, Statement by AARP CEO on Senate Passage of Medicare and
CHIP Reauthorization Act of 20i5, AARP (Apr. 15, 2015), http.r/www.aarp.org/aboutaarp/press-center/info-04-2015/medicare-and-chip-reauthorization-act-of-2015.html;
Robert Wergin, Family Physicians Applaud Passage Of Medicare Access and CHIP
Reauthorization Act, AM. ACAD. OF FAMILY PHYSICIANS (Apr. 14, 2015),
http://www.aafp.org/media-center/releases-statements/all/2015/statement-medicareaccess-chip-reauthorization-act.html; ACOG Statement on Senate Passage of the
Medicare Access and CHiP Reauthorization Act, AM. CONGo OF OBSTETRICIANS AND
GYNECOLOGISTS
(Apr.
15,
2015),
https://www.acog.org/About-ACOGlNewsRoom/Statements/20 15/ACOG-Statement-on-Senate-Passage-of-the-Medicare-Accessand-CHIP-Reauthorization-Act; ADA Applauds Passage of the Medicare Access and
ACAD.
OF
DOCTORS
OF
AUDIOLOGY
CHiP
Reauthorization
Act,
http://www.audiologist.org/latest-news-archive/1403-ada-applauds-passage-of-themedicare-access-and-chip (last visited Aug. 18, 2016); Statement on Passage ofMedicare
and CHiP Reauthorization Act of 2015, PREMIER INC. (Apr. 15, 2015),
https://www.premierinc.com/statement-on-passage-of-medicare-access-and-chipreauthorization-act-of-2015/; Statement by Rich Umbdenstock, President and CEO of the
15, 2015),
American Hospital Association, AM. Hoss. ASSN. (Apr.
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by all. 232 Nevertheless, it was historic to witness more than 750 physician
membership organizations subscribe to the repeal of the SGR growth rate
and endorse the new payment models outlined in MACRA with the goal
of aligning payments with value. 233 It was also historic to have the bill
pass overwhelmingly in both the House of Representatives with a 39237 vote 234 and the Senate with a 92-8 vote. 235 After signing the bill into
law, President Obama stated that MACRA "more directly rewards
providers for better-quality care [and] . . . creates incentives to
encourage physicians to participate in new, innovative payment models
that could further reduce the growth in Medicare spending while
preserving access to care.,,236
According to CMS, MACRA allows for a flexible payment system
that enables health care providers to choose from two different methods
of payment: the Merit-Based Incentive Payment System (MIPS) and the
Advanced
Alternative
Payments
Models
(APMs).237
Eligible professionals under the MIPS program will be measured based
on four factors: quality of service provided, resource use, clinical
practice improvement activities, and meaningful use of certified
Medicare Electronic Health Record Technology. 238 Physicians who
choose MIPS must report their performance measures to CMS. 239 Based
on their total scores, physicians who score low will be paid a reduced
fee. 240 Those who score high will be rewarded with a bonus.i" There will
http://www.aha.orgipresscenter/pressreV2015/150415-prreauthorization.shtml?ref=rss-presscenter.
232. American Society of Plastic Surgeons Responds to Medicare and CHIP
Reauthorization Act (Apr. 15, 2015), http://www.plasticsurgery.orginews/2015/americansociety-of-plastic-surgeons-responds-to-the-passage-of-hr2.html.
233. Bob Doherty, SGR Repeal and MACRA: Here's Why it is Remarkable, MEDPAGE
TODAY'S KEVIN MD (Apr. 16,2015), http://www.kevinmd.comlblog/2015/04/sgr-repealand-macra-heres-why-its-remarkable.html.
234. 161 CONGo REc. H51 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2015) (regarding the consideration of
H.R.2, Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of2015).
235. 161 CONGo REc. S52 (daily ed. Apr. 14,2015).
236. Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Sec'y, Statement by the
President on the Passage of a Permanent Fix to the Medicare Physician Payment System,
(Apr. 14,2015) (on file with author).
237. Quality Payment Program: Delivery System Reform, Medicare Payment Reform,
&
MACRA,
CTRS.
FOR
MEDICARE
AND
MEDICAID
SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quaiity-Initiatives-Patient-AssessmentInstrumentsNalue-Based-Programs/MACRA-MIPS-and-APMs/MACRA-MlPS-andAPMs.html (last visited Aug. 18,2016).
238. Id.
239. Steven Findlay, Medicare's New Physician Payment System: A 2015 Law has the
Potential to Transform How Medicare Pays Physicians, HEALTH AFFAIRS 3 (Apr. 21,
2016), http://healthaffairs.orglhealthpolicybriefs/brief-pdfs/healthpolicybrieC156.pdf.
240. Id.
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be a limit as to how high or Iowa bonus can be with maximum bonuses
and penalties set at "4 percent in 2019, 5 percent in 2020, 7 percent in
2021, and 9 percent in 2022 and beyond. ,,242
Alternatively, physicians may choose to be paid for their services
based on an APMs model. 243 Some examples of approved APMs under
MACRA are: accountable care organizations (ACOs), patient centered
medical homes, and bundled payments models.i" Regardless of which
model is chosen, a physician's services need to be measured based on the
quality of care provided and overall spending.i" Physicians participating
in APMs "may be eligible for an annual lump-sum bonus payment equal
to 5 percent of their prior year's payments for [their] professional
services.,,246 Additional benefits for APM participants include
"exemption from the MIPS [program] and, beginning in 2026, receipt of
a higher annual payment update under the Medicare Physician Fee
Schedule than those clinicians who do not significantly participate in an
Advanced APM (0.75 percent vs. 0.25 percent).,,247
Proposed regulations for MACRA were published by CMS in April
28, 2016. 248 A final rule is expected by November 1, 2016. 249 Because
final regulations are pending, the MIPS. and APMs payment models have
not yet been implemented. Instead, "[b]etween 2016 and 2019, MACRA
will give physicians a fee increase of 0.5 percent per year.,,250 Thereafter,
starting in 2020, these systematic fee increases will be eliminated and
physicians will be asked to choose which MACRA payment model they
wish to participate in.25l However, physicians participating in MIPS need
to keep track and submit their performance measures to CMS starting in
January 2017. 252 Payments for those measures will take place in 2019. 253

241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Quality Payment Program, supra note 237.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Robert F. Atlas, David B. Tatge & Lesley R. Yeung, All About APMs: What Will
It Take for Physicians to Earn the APM Bonus Under MACRA?, EpSTEIN, BECKER &
GREEN 1 (June 2016), http://www.ebglaw.com/contentJuploads/2016/06/HCLS-ClientAlert-AIl-About-APMs.pdf.
247. Id. at 2.
248. 42 C.F.R. §§ 414, 495 (2016).
249. Physician Payment Reform Under MACRA, ISSUE BRIEF 1 (July 15, 2016),
http://www.aha.org/contentJI6/16macraissuebrief.pdf.
250. Findlay, supra note 239, at 3.
251. !d.
252. Notice of Proposed Rule-Making, Quality Payment Program, Medicare Access
and CHIP Reauthorization Act, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-
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III. THE PRESENT MISALIGNMENT BETWEEN STARK AND
MACRA
The federal government's challenge is to fmd a way to harmonize
new laws born out of the present payment reform movement, such as
MACRA, and entrenched laws born out of the more antiquated and
constrained fee-for-service world, such as Stark's physician
compensation prohibitions. To date, all of the alternative payment
models that have preceded MACRA have been issued a CMS waiver that
frees them from the constraints of Stark.254 In contrast, neither MACRA
nor CMS's proposed MACRA regulations provide any additional
waivers to Stark enforcement. Yet, the existing waivers "do not protect
all of the APMs under MACRA nor do they protect APMs that are
implemented by commercial payers.,,255 Instead, MACRA mandates that
the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services conduct a
study and prepare a report on fraud and abuse within the Medicare
program and how it relates to MACRA's alternative payment models.i"
The study is to "identify aspects of [MACRA's] alternative payment
models that are vulnerable to fraudulent activity and consider the
implications of waivers of federal fraud prevention laws in support of
such alternative payment models.,,257 More importantly, the report is to
make recommendations regarding suggested changes to federal fraud and
abuse laws to enable the proper implementation of MACRA's alternative
payment models.r" This report is due to Congress on April 15, 2017two years after MACRA's enactment.i"
A. Stark and MACRA: Why They Don't Get Along
For years, the health care industry has been clamoring for changes to
Stark. In 2009, the Public Interest Committee of the American Health
InstrumentsNalue-Based-Programs/.MACRA-MIPS-and-APMsINPRM-QPP-FactSheet.pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 2016).
253. Id.
254. See, e.g., Final Waivers in Connection with the Shared Savings Program, 80 Fed.
Reg. 66725 (Oct. 29, 2015) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R.).
255. Rodney L. Whitlock, Laurence J. Freedman & Jordan T. Cohen, Senate
Committee Releases Report on Potential Stark Law Changes, Hearing Scheduled, MINTZ
LEVIN
COHN
FERRIS
GLOVSKY
AND
POPEO
(July
7,
2016),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=3bdcda8f-ed66-4673-a4ae-bfOf65bI9a8d.
256. Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-10,
§ 101(e)(7), 129 Stat. 128 (2015).
257. !d.
258. Id.
259. Id.
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Lawyers Association convened to discuss Stark and its effects on the
health care industry as a whole.i'" Referred to as a "Convener on Stark
Law," participants from a cross-section of the health care community
were asked to address three areas of inquiry: (1) whether Stark was
working as originally intended; (2) Stark's impact on the industry and the
benefits and challenges it has brought forth; and (3) ways to improve
Stark. 261 While Convener participants lauded Stark for contributing to the
development of corporate compliance programs and restricting physician
investment in health care enterprises, they enumerated a series of
unintended consequences that appeared to be doing more harm than
good. 262 Even though Stark was intended to provide a bright line test
limiting physician self-referral.P'' Convener participants agreed that
Stark's application has ''yielded few bright lines.,,264 Stark's "vast array
of exceptions ... have driven the restructuring of the healthcare delivery
system and in some cases created either an unlevel playing field or
unclear boundaries.Y" In addition, "[a]rrangements such as pay-forperformance, shared savings and bundled payments are frequently
problematic under the Stark law because they may not fit squarely within
any existing exception.Y" Convener participants went on to state that
non-compliance under Stark is unavoidable as even the most wellintended health care provider is unable to wrap her head around its many
complexities and draconian strict liability provisions.f" Lastly,
regardless of whether a Stark violation is technical or non.-technical, the
resulting liability, when coupled with the might of the False Claims Act,
leads to penalties that are substantially disproportional to the prohibited
conduct.268
At a time when MACRA "encourages providers to create larger
organizations that can coordinate care in pursuit of greater quality and
260. AM. HEALTIlLAWYERS ASS'N PUB. INTEREST COMM., supra note 142, at 1:
The purpose of the Convener Session was to provide a forum for a candid
discussion of the efficacy of the federal physician self-referral statute or
Stark Law and to consider what, if any, changes to the Law might be
beneficial in light of both the current structure of the healthcare delivery
system and pending healthcare reform proposal.
Id.
261. Id. at 1-2.
262. Id. at 2-3.
263. See 135 CONGo REc. H240-01 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1989) (statement of Rep. Stark);
66 Fed. Reg. 856, 860 (Jan. 4, 2008).
264. AM. HEALTIlLAWYERS ASS'NPUB. INTEREST COMM., supra note 142, at 3.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
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efficiency,,,269 Stark holds health care providers back with a blanket
prohibition of physician financial relationships unless a physician
relationship fits perfectly within one of its exceptions.r" Though the
exceptions are numerous, they are subject to complex criteria and
significant regulatory interpretation. Some characterize the exceptions as
illusory because each exception is dependent on factual determinations
that would ultimately have to be proven at trial. 271 Because many of the
terms used in the exceptions-such as "fair market value" and
"commercially reasonable"-are ambiguous, a determination as to
whether or not the facts of any given financial relationship meet the
criteria of an exception leads to many inconsistent and unpredictable
results. 272 As a consequence, Stark discourages innovation in health care
due to fears of potential non-compliance. This fear of entering into a
prohibited financial relationship has the effect of encouraging health care
providers to work separately and not in a coordinated, patient-centered
manner as required by MACRA.
B. The Health Care Industry Stakeholders Speak-Up

The Senate Finance Committee and the House Committee on Ways
and Means has taken a keen interest on the needed steps, if any, towards
reforming Stark. On December 10, 2015, both Committees hosted a
roundtable composed of health care industry leaders to discuss Stark in
light of the new alternative payment models under the Affordable Care
Act and MACRA. 273 Thereafter, the Committees extended an invitation
to all health care industry stakeholders to submit written comments
regarding Stark's challenges and suggested changes.i" In response to
this request for comment, the Committees received almost fifty responses
suggesting numerous changes to Stark. 275 A representative cross-section
of the recommendations received are categorized as follows:

269. Joe Carlson, Pulled in Two Directions: Providers Pursing Coordinated Care
Confused by Antitrust Actions, 42 (51) MODERNHEALTHCARE 1,6,7, 16 (Dec. 15,2012).
270. See 42 C.F.R. Subpart J, § 411.355 et seq. (2016) (providing for ten general
exceptions and numerous other exceptions for certain ownership and investment interests
and compensation arrangements).
271. SENATE FINANCE COMM. MAJORITY STAFF REP., supra note 184, at 5.
272. !d.
273. Id. at 1.
274. James Swann, Lawmakers Consider Changes to Physician Self-Referral Law,
BLOOMBERG'S . HEALTH
CARE
DAILY
REPORT
(Feb.
1,
2016),
http://www.bna.com/lawmakers-consider-changes-n57982066790/.
275. Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin., Hatch Statement on Finance Hearing
on the Stark Law (July 12,2016) (on file with author).
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1. Repeal Stark. Several respondents recommended that Stark be
repealed in its entirety. The American College of Gastroenterology, for
example, described Stark as an antiquated law and stated that it "has run
its course and is actually hindering the drive toward better coordinated
and cost-effective care.,,276 The letter went on to say that its members are
"fearful to adopt new and innovative methods of health care delivery as
they may trigger some gray areas of this antiquated law."m The letter
noted that ''the fact that the Stark Law is outdated is demonstrated by the
ongoing need to continue adding "exceptions" to the rule each time CMS
implements a new coordinated-care payment model authorized by
Congress.,,278 Interestingly, all respondents who suggested Stark be
repealed also provided, in the alternative, several non-repeal options,
signaling to the reader no hope in a repeal but, at best, only
modifications.
2. Repeal the Compensation Arrangement Arm of Stark. Other
respondents, such as the American Osteopathic Association (AOA),
recommended only a repeal of the physician compensation arrangement
arm of Stark, while leaving intact the ownership or investment interest
portion of the law. 279 The letter refers to Stark as a "complicated legal
web" that creates a conundrum for those physicians who find themselves
in a blended payment framework wherein a portion of their
compensation emanates from a traditional fee-for-service environment
while the remaining portion is generated from participation in an
APM?80 The question posed by the organization is, "'[e]ven if 'carveouts' to Stark restrictions are created for the APM portion of a
participating physician's practice, will his or her remaining fee-forservice arrangement still be subject to the [Stark] law?,,281 The AOA is
vehement about repealing the entire compensation arrangement arm of
the law, stating that only modifying it will only add more layers of
complexity and uncertainty to an already complex and confusing law. 282
The letter ends by arguing that "hav[ing] two sets of requirements for
fee-for-service and for APMs under MACRA will be very difficult, and

276. Letter from the Am. Coli. of Gastroenterology to the Senate Comm. on Fin. and
the House Comm. on Ways and Means, at 1 (Feb. 3, 2016) (on file with author).
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278.
279.
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280.
281.
282.

Id. at 2.
Letter from the Am. Osteopathic Ass'n to the Senate Comm. on Fin. and the
Comm. on Ways and Means, at 2 (Jan. 29, 2016) (on file with author).
Id. at 1.
Id at 2.
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could inhibit or dissuade physicians from taking the risk to transition to
these new arrangements.t'i"
The Medical Group Management Association, another group that
favors the repeal of the compensation arrangement arm of Stark, notes in
its response that nothing in the last twenty years has given anyone hope
that the compensation provisions of Stark can ever be improved.i" In
reference to Stark's prohibition against certain compensation
arrangements, it states that "despite countless rule-makings at CMS, each
of which identified legitimate problems with the regulations and
attempted to fix them, the regulatory scheme has grown in complexity to
the point where it is beyond comprehension to the average physician or
health care administrator.vi"
The American Vrological Association (AVA) does not go as far as to
request the repeal of the compensation arrangement arm of Stark but
does request a significant softening of its Iimitations.f" Specifically, the
AVA asks that physician compensation arrangements that do not violate
the Anti-Kickback Statute be deemed a technical violation of Stark and
carry no penalties.i" In the alternative, the AVA proposes that physician
compensation arrangements that violate Stark, but do not confer a
financial benefit on the offending physician, be deemed a technical
violation of Stark with no penalties either. 288 The underlying theme ofthe
AVA's letter is that Congress needs to make much-needed changes to the
law if it wishes to engage physicians to participate in the new alternative
payment models.i"
3. Create New Exceptions. Several respondents, including the
American Hospital Association (AHA), recommend that Congress create
a new exception. Specifically, the AHA asks that "a single, broad
exception that cuts across the Stark law, the Anti-Kickback statute, and
relevant [Civil Monetary Penalties] for fmancial relationships designed
to foster collaboration in the delivery of health care and incentivize [as
well as] reward efficiencies and improvements in care.,,290 The AHA
goes on to request that this new exception be enacted under the Anti283. !d.
284. Letter from the Med. Grp. Mgmt. Ass'n to the Senate Comm. on Fin. and the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, at 2 (Jan. 28,2016) (on file with author).
285. Id.
286. Letter from the Am. Urological Ass'n to the Senate Comm. on Fin. and the House
Comm. on Ways and Means (Feb. 3, 2016) (on file with author).
287. Id. at 3.
288. Id. at 4.
289. Id.
290. Letter from the Am. Hosp. Ass'n to the Senate Comm. on Fin. and the House
Comm. on Ways and Means, at 2 (Jan. 29, 2016) (on file with author).
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Kickback Statute and that any relationships deemed compliant under this
exception be automatically deemed compliant under corresponding
provisions of Stark and the Civil Monetary Penalties Act. 291 The AHA's
letter reminds Congress that Stark's "oversight of compensation
arrangements is anchored in a fee-for-service world where physicians
were self-employed, hospitals were separate entities, and both billed for
services on a piecemeal basis.,,292 As it pertains to enforcement, the AHA
emphatically states that Stark should only be enforced when there is
actual harm and that the government should take into account mitigating
factors when a violation occurs (i.e. " ... an innocent or unintentional
mistake; the corrective action taken by the parties; whether the services
provided were reasonably arid medically necessary; [or] whether access
to a physician's services was required in an emergency situation ... ,,).293
4. Broaden Existing Exceptions. Several respondents, including the
Hospital and Health System Association of Pennsylvania (HAP),
recommend an expansion of existing exceptions.i'" In HAP's response, it
requests that the existing statutory prepaid plan exception of Stark 295 "be
broadened so that the prohibition on referrals for designated health
services ... does not apply to services rendered by an entity that has a
contract with CMS or its agent and that contemplates the use of payment
models alternative to fee-for-service.Y" HAP, in its response, echoed a
continuing theme amongst all respondents; namely, that "[c]ooperative
arrangements among providers will be necessary to improve quality and
manage costs and the Stark Law-which is based upon the assumption
that cooperative arrangements among health care providers may create
incentives for overutilization-is explicitly designed to discourage such
relationships. ,,297
5. Expand Current Waivers. Several respondents, such as the
American College of Physicians (ACP), recommend expanding the Stark
waivers that already exist in the Medicare Shared Savings plan to all
programs being tested by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid
Innovation as well as to all value-based payment structures, including
APMs, under MACRA. 298 The ACP emphasized, like so many other
291. Id.
292. Id. at 3.
293. Id. at 6.
294. THE Hosr, AND HEALTH SYS. OF PA., supra note 32, at 5.
295. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(3) (2016).
296. THEHosr, AND HEALTH SYS. OF PA., supra note 32, at 5.
297. Id. at 3.
298. Letter from Wayne J. Riley, President, Am. ColI. of Physicians, to Kim Brandt,
Chief Oversight Counsel, U.S. Senate, and Tegan Gelfand, Profl Staff Member, U.S.
House of Representatives, at 3 (Feb. 3, 2016) (on file with author).

2017]

MACRA AND STARK: HEALTH CARE REFORM

173

respondents did, that Stark "may impose unnecessary burdens and
barriers under the value-based payment pathways, MIPS and APMs,
created by MACRA ... , [and that such] regulatory controls may inhibit
approaches and innovation . . . [such as] care integration, care
coordination, and patient engagement[.],,299
.
6. Expand CMS's Authority. A significant number of respondents
also requested that Congress empower CMS to create new exceptions to
Stark. For example, in a letter signed by twenty-two health care
organizations, it was urged that Congress give CMS the flexibility
needed "to refme the regulatory landscape as the health system continues
to transform and as payment models continue to evolve.,,30o The letter
noted that "must as Congress could not in 1993 foresee what exceptions
might be necessary in 2016, this Congress cannot foresee how health
care may be delivered years hence.,,301 In similar fashion, the American
Urological Association requests that the CMS advisory opinion process
be changed to grant CMS the authority to "permit financial arrangements
that may otherwise violate the Stark law, but which would not cause
more than a minimal risk of fraud or abuse[.],,302
7. Change. Expand. or Clarify Existing Statutory Language. A
recurring theme in many of the responses is the inherent ambiguity in
several terms found in Stark's statutory language. For example, the
American College of Physicians requests that Congress clarify and
expand the meaning of "fair market value" under Stark. 303 The Congress
of Neurological Surgeons, the Society for Vascular Surgery, and the
American College of Rheumatology, to name a few, recommend that
Congress remove the terms "value" or "volume" from the defmition of
"group practice" as "this language ... creates enormous confusion and
opportunities for technical non-compliance.T'" The Federation of
American Hospitals (FAH) requests that the "commercially reasonable"
standard be eliminated as "[it] is vague and not generally well

299. Id.
300. Letter from Am. Acad. of Ophthalmology et aI., to Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman,
Comm. on Fin. and Kevin Brady, Chairman, Comm. on Ways and Means, at 2 (Feb. 5,
2016) (on file with author).
301. Id.
302. Id. Letter from Am. Urological Ass'n to Kim Brandt, Chairman, Senate Fin.
Comm., and Tegan Gelfand, Chairman, House Comm. on Ways and Means, at 5
(February 3, 2016) (on file with author).
303. Letter from Thomas P. Nickles, Exec. Vice President, Am. Hosp. Ass'n, supra
note 290, at 3.
304. Letter from Am. Acad. of Ophthalmology et aI., supra note 300, at 2.
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understood or objectively measured. ,,305 The FAH argues that
"[a]ttempting to apply a vague and poorly understood standard such as
commercial reasonableness [to the new alternative payment models]
creates more uncertainty and is a significant barrier that threatens to chill
development and implementation of these new models.,,306 The
Association of American Medical Colleges is of the mindset that
including terms such as '''fair market value,' 'volume or value,' and
'other generated business' standards" as it relates to prohibited
compensation arrangements "make[s] it difficult to structure incentive
payments that reward physicians for improvements in quality and
efficiency.,,307
8. Other Relevant Recommendations. There are other
recommendations made by respondents that are worth noting. The
American College of Physicians requests that Congress formally request
the Health and Human Services Secretary to investigate and assess all
statutes and regulations that pertain to the integrity of the Medicare
program to determine "the potential barriers and unnecessary burdens
that these laws and regulations may place on the delivery of valueoriented care" and to make recommendations to eliminate these barriers
and burdens.r'" Numerous respondents also recommend that Congress
make a distinction between technical violations and material violations,
noting that technical violations should either carry no penalty or only a
penalty commensurate with the harm caused, if any.309 Many also argue
that complying with Stark is administratively costly, yet "Medicare
reimbursements do not compensate these extra costs which have
fundamentally nothing to do with the delivery of quality health care.,,310
Overall, the unifying theme among all the responses sent to the Senate
Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Ways and Means
regarding Stark can be summed up in three statements: Stark is
unreasonably complex, Stark enforcement is draconian, and Stark is a
serious obstacle to the implementation of alternative payment models,
including those found in MACRA.

305. Letter from the Fed'n of Am. Hosp. to Orrin Hatch, Chairman, Senate Fin.
Comm. and Kevin Brady, Chairman, House Comm. on Ways and Means, at 5 (Feb. 11,
2016)(on file with author).
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307. Letter from the Ass'n of Am. Med. Colis. to Kim Brandt, Chief Oversight
Counsel, U.S. Senate Comm. on Fin. and Tegan Gelfand, Prof! Staff Member, House
Ways and Means Comm., at 2 (Jan. 27, 2016) (on file with author).
308. Letter from Am. ColI. of Physicians, supra note 298, at 3.
309. THE Hosr. AND HEALTH Svs, OF PA., supra note 32, at 4-5.
310. Letter from the Med. Grp. Mgmt. Ass'n, supra note 284, at 4.
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IV. HOW TO BEST ALIGN STARK AND MACRA
When determining how to reconcile Stark and MACRA, it is
imperative that the principle of "business simplification" be included in
the discussion. In the business world, "business simplification" can be
defined as "stripping away layers of bureaucracy, letting employees do
what do what they do best, and focusing the entire business network on
what's important to customersj.j't"! One of the many benefits of
business simplification is that, all other things remaining equal, it has the
effect of improving quality and efficiency, reducing redundancy, and
reducing costs. 312 Each time a process is simplified by the removal of
unnecessary complexity, the shortcomings and challenges associated
with the complexity also are removed.i"
In determining how to best harmonize Stark and MACRA, Congress
should be guided by the principle of business simplification. The federal
government's goal should be to strip away any unnecessary layers of
regulation, let health care providers do what they do best, and refocus the
entire Medicare program on what is in the patients' best interest. As
Daniel A. Levinthal, a management professor at the Wharton School of
Business, stated: "[a]s organizations get pulled in different ways [by
numerous change agents such as technology, demand, supply, economy,
or politics] there's a natural inclination that causes them to accumulate
more complex processes.v''" This has occurred in the health care
industry as changes in the economy, political landscape, demographics,
scientific advancements, and technology are constant agents of change
over the years and led the federal government to create more laws and
regulations.?" Stark expanded over the years via a series of legislative
311. Becky Wieber, 4 Myths, 4 Reasons: Why You Should Pay Attention to Business
Now,
DIGITALIST
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(Apr.
6,
2015),
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amendments and a piling of piecemeal regulations.i'" This continual
layering of rules and regulations have added to Stark's complexity and,
with it, .created confusion, increased administrative burdens, and
dissuaded innovation.l'" Professor Levinthal explained that, in business,
such layering is meant to solve a problem or challenge in the short-term,
yet the long-term costs to any system are "foregone efficiencies.Y"
CMS's lax enforcement of Stark, its sizeable backlog of Stark violation
self-disclosures, and its failure to provide significant guidance through its
advisory opinion authority, may all be signs of a government agency that
is spread too thin as it attempts to manage and enforce a law that is too
complex.
One recent government action that indicates the federal government
has some understanding of the importance of simplification is the
administrative simplification provisions as enacted in the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).319 Section 1104 of the
ACA320 made significant amendments to the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996.321 The federal government
acknowledged that the average physician spends a cumulative total of
three weeks per year on billing and insurance related tasks,322 and that
"two-thirds of a full-time employee per physician is necessary to conduct
billing and insurance-related tasks.,,323 Thus, the goal of the
administrative provisions is to reduce costs and eliminate unnecessary
processes as providers, health plans, vendors, and clearinghouses
exchange patient and other medical information.l" Accordingly, the
ACA empowered the Secretary of Health and Human Services to create
regulations to achieve the goals of the administrative simplification
provisions and "to adopt standards for the electronic transmission of
316. See Letter from the Am. Urological Ass'n, supra note 286.
317. See AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS'NPuB. INTERESTCOMM., supra note 142, at 4-5.
318. Id.
319. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148 § 1104, 124
Stat. 119 (2010).
320. Id.
321. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 100
Stat. 1936 (1996).
322. Lawrence P. Casalino et aI., What Does It Cost Physician Practices To Interact
MAGAZINE
(2009),
with Health Insurance Plans?, HEALTH AFFAIRS
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/4/w533.full.
323. Julie Ann Sakowski et aI., Peering Into the Black Box: Billing And Insurance
Activities In A Medical Group, HEALTH AFFAIRS MAGAZINE (2009),
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administrative and. financial information throughout the healthcare
system.,,325
Although it is difficult to determine the exact savings achieved by
the passage and implementation of the administrative simplification
provisions and their accompanying regulations, it is estimated that it has
resulted in a savings anywhere between $1 billion to $2.8 billion for the
country as a whole per year. 326 Many industry professionals are of the
opinion that even greater savings. can be achieved with additional
changes that have simplification of processes and procedures as its main
goal.327
Notwithstanding this great achievement in the HIPAA arena,328 the
theme of simplification has been otherwise absent in the discussion of
improving the quality of health care while improving costs. The
legislative approach, thus far, has not been forward-thinking, but instead
has consisted of good faith attempts to put a bandage on issues and
challenges as they arise. This approach had led to a systematic layering
of new rules and procedures to existing laws, including Stark. The most
recent input received from the health care industry through the many
letters received by the Senate Committee on Finance and the House
Committee on Ways and Means sums up the industry's frustration with
Stark, as it has gone beyond its original intent and demands substantial
manpower to implement with no one individual or organization having
certainty of being in compliance.
The' concerns expressed by health care professionals in 2009 at the
Convener on Stark Law sponsored by the Health Lawyers Association
are the same concerns, seven years later, that health care professionals
have today.329 On June 30, 2016, the Senate Committee on Finance
published a white paper regarding the current state of Stark.330 In said
publication, the Senate Committee on Finance acknowledged that despite
CMS's best efforts to provide guidance, ''the Stark law's breadth,
complexity, and impenetrability have created a minefield for the health

325. Ninth Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Administrative
Simplification Provisions of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996,
at
4
(May
11,
2010),
http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2014/05/100511hipaarpt.pdf.
326. Elizabeth Wikler, Peter Basch, & David Cutler, Paper Cuts: Reducing Health
Care Administrative Costs, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, at 13 (June 11, 2012),
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/issuesl2012/06/pdf/paper_cuts_intro. pdf.
327. Id. at 1.
328. Id. at 7.
329. See Carnell, supra note 139, at 3, 5-6.
330. SENATE FINANCE COMM. MAJORITY STAFF REP., supra note 184, at 1,4.
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care industry.v" In addition, the Committee acknowledged that "[t]he
Stark law has become increasingly unnecessary for, and a significant
impediment to, value-based payment models that Congress, CMS, and
commercial health insurers have promoted.,,332 It also acknowledged that
the new alternative payment models eliminate the risk of overutilization,
which was the main impetus for the passage of Stark back in 1989. 333
One of the most alarming facts highlighted in the Committee's
document pertains to the recent qui tam lawsuits and the upper hand the
federal government has had in such situations.i" The Committee referred
to several False Claim Act settlements in which the government deemed
a loss on the profit and loss statement of several hospital-owned
physician practices as ipso facto evidence that the physicians'
compensation were not at "fair market value" nor "commercially
reasonable" and, thus, out of compliance with Stark. 335 Because so many
of Stark's prohibitions are fact-specific.i" the Committee agrees that
health care providers are continually at risk of having to expend an
enormous amount of time and money to defend themselves in these
lawsuits.r" Unfortunately, the Committee acknowledged that:
[F]or challenges based on any Stark law exceptions with
AKS/Claims Requirements, a hospital would not be able to
prevail on a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary
judgment because resolving the Stark law claims requires the
court to also determine whether the fmancial relationship at issue
satisfies the highly fact-specific AKS/Claims Requirementsj.j"
Resolving the Stark Law claims also requires making factual
findings regarding "fair market value, the volume and value of referrals,
and commercial reasonableness.vt" Thus, based on the Committee's
report, it appears that Congress is aware there is a problem. The question
now is how to solve it.
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A. Eliminate the Physician Compensation Arrangement Arm of
Stark
For several reasons, the best solution in aligning Stark with
MACRA's new payment models is to repeal the physician compensation
arm of Stark. First, the original intent behind the enactment of Stark was
to prevent the documented overutilization and abuse that occurred when
physicians referred patients to ancillary service companies in which they
had an ownership or investment interest. 340 There is no evidence in the
Congressional Record that Stark was meant to prohibit anything more.i"
Stark was supposed to provide a "bright-line" test to prohibit these types
of physician self-referrals.Y Yet, the least "bright-line" of all Stark's
provisions is the physician compensation arrangement provisions.l"
Time and time again, health care professionals have provided anecdotal
evidence showing the complexity and ambiguity of its provisions.i"
Terms such as "fair market value," "volume or value of referrals,"
"commercially reasonable," or ''takes into account" have been deemed to
be ambiguous, as they are factual and have been interpreted in the
different ways depending on the circumstances.t" This inconsistency in
results has led to great uncertainty in the health care community, as even
the best efforts of any given health care provider does not ensure

compliance.l"
Second, repealing the physician compensation arrangement arm of
Stark would instantly eliminate the corresponding headaches that this
provision has caused over the years. Not only would there no longer be
debates in or outside of court as to what the terms "fair market value,"
''volume or value of referrals," "commercially reasonable," or "takes into
account" mean,347 but health care administrators would no longer have to
invest countless hours in drafting, negotiating, researching, and
discussing-most often with the assistance of costly legal counsel-how
to draft a "compliant" physician compensation agreement.l" Most would

340. Patrick A. Sutton, The Stark Law in Retrospect, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L. 15, 16-18
(2011).
341. Id. at 23.
342. Id.
343. See id. at 33-34.
344. See id. at 35.
345. See Hatch, supra note 275, at 15.
346. Id. at 17.
347. See id. at 15.
348. See id. at 17; see also AM. HEALTH LAWYERS ASS'N PuB. INTEREST COMM., supra
note 142, at 10-11.
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agree that these resources would be best directed to activities that have a
direct impact on patient care.
Third, the risk of overutilization as it pertains to physician
compensation agreements is substantially eliminated by the new
"alternative payment models,"349 such as those in MACRA.350 In the
traditional fee-for-service model.i" physicians are rewarded for sheer
volume of services without regard for the quality of services rendered.352
Under MACRA, volume is' no longer part of the equation.353 Instead,
physicians are rewarded for delivering quality care in a cost-efficient
manner?54 Under this new framework, the goals of physicians become
perfectly aligned with the goals of the federal government.l" As it
pertains to physician compensation agreements, there is no longer the
danger, for example, that a hospital will nicely pad a physician
compensation agreement in exchange for the physician referring patients
to other services offered in the hospital.f" In such a situation, under
MACRA, a physician is incentivized to make the referral only if it will
contribute to that patient's quality of care in a cost efficient manner.357
Under such a scenario, the physician's profit margin is not tied to volume
anymore.i" Instead, it is tied to quality of care and cost efficiency.f"
Fourth, the Anti-Kickback Statute today is very different from the
Anti-Kickback Statute that existed when Stark was initially enacted.i'"
Presently, the Anti-Kickback Statute already protects against physicians
receiving anything of value to induce or reward referrals or generate
federal health care program business.i?' Such a prohibition ensures that
physician compensation agreements remain arms-length transactions. In
addition, the Anti-Kickback Statute has been ex~anded to provide for
civil enforcement under the False Claims Acr" and Civil Monetary
Statute in addition to criminal enforcement mechanisms that already

349. See Hatch, supra note 275, at 2.
350. !d. at 3.
351. Id. at 1.
352. See supra text accompanying note 14.
353. See Medicare Access and CHIP Authorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. I14-1O,
129 Stat. 87 (2015).
354. See supra text accompanying note 20.
355. See Sutton, supra note 340, at 16.
356. See supra text accompanying notes 30-33.
357. See supra text accompanying note 27.
358. See Hatch, supra note 275, at 2.
359. Id.
360. See id. at6.
361. See id. at 10; see also Sutton, supra note 340, at 16 n.8.
362. See supra text accompanying note 94.
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existed at the time when Stark was enacted.l" Now, any item or service
that is deemed a violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute will
automatically constitute a "false or fraudulent claim" under the Federal
Claims Act. 364 Similarly, violations under the Anti-Kickback Statute can
amount to penalties of up to $50,000 per violation and treble damages
under the Civil Monetary Penalties Statute.365
To broaden the reach of the Anti-Kickback Statute, in 2010, the
ACA366 made it clear that to satisfy the "knowledge" requirement of the
statute it is not necessary to prove that the defendant knew he was
violating the Anti-Kickback Statute.367 Instead, the ACA lowered the
threshold of proof by stating that to prove the defendant possessed the
requisite "knowledge," it is only necessary to prove that defendant knew
he was violating the law.368 In addition, the ACA mandated some
changes to the United States Sentencing Commission Guidelines Manual
that have led to the further strengthening of the Anti-Kickback Statute.369
In section 10606 of the AcA, the United States Sentencing Commission
was mandated to enhance sentences for federal health care offenses
based on the amount of loss, as follows: 1) a two-level increase in
offense level if the loss is between $1 million and $7 million; 2) a threelevel increase in offense level if the loss is between $7 million and $20
million; and 3) a four-level increase in offense level if the loss equals or
exceeds $20 million.37o In sum, the Anti-Kickback Statute is a much
more powerful tool today than it was when Stark as enacted. As such, it
has the capability needed to address any concerns or possible abuses that
may arise in physician compensation agreements. Hence, the AntiKickback Statute has made the physician compensation provisions of
Stark irrelevant.
B. Why Repealing Stark in Its Entirety is Not the Answer

Although many health care commentators have argued for the
complete repeal of Stark,371 this recommendation is ill-advised. The
363. See supra text accompanying note 200.
364. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g) (2015).
365. Id. at § 1320a-7a(a).
366. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1, 124
Stat. 119 (2010).
367. Id.
368. Id. (stating: "[w]ith respect to violations of this section, a person need not have
actual knowledge of this section or specific intent to commit a violation of this section.").
369. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 10606,
124 Stat. 1006-1007 (2010).
370. Id.
371. See supra Part IV.B.!.
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ownership and investment interest prohibitions of Stark conform to the
original intent of the statute.372 Stark was enacted as a response to the
overutilization of federal funds to increase physician profit margins.i"
Back in the 1970's and 1980's, empirical evidence was gathered to show
the increased pattern of referrals to entities in which a physician had
either an ownership or investment interest.374 If this section of Stark was
repealed today, these overutilization patterns would likely repeat
themselves.
Some may argue that the Stark prohibition against ownership or
investment interest is not needed due to the expansive protections of the
Anti-Kickback Statute. However, the reverse is true. Stark's ownership
or investment arm has strengths that the Anti-Kickback Statute does not
possess. First, Stark is a strict liability statutc'" while the Anti-Kickback
Statute is not.376 Under the Anti-Kickback Statute, a defendant must
knowingly and willfully violate the law,377 while under Stark, intent is
irrelevant.i" If this arm of the statute was repealed, it could potentially
create a loophole for physicians who engage in a prohibited self-referral,
but against whom there is not sufficient evidence to prove the selfreferral was knowing and willful.379 Second, when the Stark Law was
enacted, the motivation behind making it a strict liability law was to
create "bright lines,,38o and, thus, dissuade physicians from engaging in
self-referrals of any kind.381 As a statute specifically targeted to
physicians, its existence serves to underscore the problem inherent with
self-referral and admonish physicians about the evils of engaging in such
conduct.382
Another reason why Stark's ownership or investment arm need not
be repealed is because, unlike Stark's physician compensation
arrangement arm, it is not in contravention to the new alternative
payment forms, such as those found in MACRA.383 Also, unlike Stark's
physician compensation arrangement arm, it is not rift with ambiguous
terms that require factual determinations and lead to inconsistent rulings
372. See supra text accompanying note 328.
373. Id.
374. See Sutton, supra note 340, at 17.
375. See Rumph, supra note 137.
376. See supra text accompanying note 132.
377. See 492 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(h)(2015).
378. See supra text accompanying note 139.
379. See 492 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(h)(2015).
380. See supra note 260 and text accompanying.
381. See supra text accompanying note 30.
382. See supra text accompanying note 31.
383. See Medicare Access and Authorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-10, 129
Stat. 87 (2015).
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when such determinations are made. 384 This is not the arm of Stark that
health care administrators deem as complex, burdensome, and
incomprehensible. This is the arm of Stark that was straightforward from
the beginning as it is the arm of Stark that was born from the original
intent of the statute.

C. Because Time is ofthe Essence, Bi-Partisan Action is Needed
Now
Just as Congress was united in enacting MACRA, so should
Congress be united in repealing the compensation arm of Stark.
Implementation of MACRA will begin in January 2017 and if these
needed changes to Stark are not made, it is more likely than not that there
will be weak participation in MACRA's APMs and physicians will have
little buy-in into the benefits of alternative payment systems. Repealing
the physician compensation arrangement arm of Stark would be an
important step toward simplification and increased efficiencies.

384. See supra text accompanying note 349.

